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1 Introduction
The wide cross-country disparities in output per capita have motivated an extensive literature
that decomposes them into total factor productivity (TFP) and factor supply differences.1 It is
well known that such decompositions often carry with them large cross-country disparities in the
returns of factors, e.g. Lucas (1990). The impact of the distortions and the barriers that can
sustain the cross-country factor returns differences are often left unexplored. Yet, the removal of
such distortions, as observed since the early 1980s (Buera et al., 2011) could drastically change
the cross-country allocation of factors and the resulting world income distribution.
This paper evaluates the distributional and global efficiency consequences of observed and
counterfactual changes in the barriers to factor accumulation and mobility for many countries
and years. Our contribution is twofold. First, we construct a new database to measure the
income share of natural resources for many countries and years, which are needed to correctly
measure the output share of physical and human capital. Our estimates rectify the existent
numbers in the literature, which either ignore rents to natural resources or largely overestimate
them, as we explain below. Second, we document a number of salient patterns in the global
production efficiency over the years. The persistence of a significant degree of global misallocation
notwithstanding, these last 35 years witnessed a remarkable movement toward efficiency.
We explicitly consider natural resources as inputs of production and measure their aggregate
rents. Natural resources, such as land and minerals, account for a quantitatively relevant share of
the net income (added value) for some countries (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). Thus, the common
practice of ignoring these factors inflates the marginal product of physical capital (MPK), as
non-labor income ends up being imputed to the traditional measures of physical capital (i.e.,
equipment and structures). The problem is most severe for lower-income countries where natural
resources tend to have a higher share in aggregate income. Indeed, Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
argue that after controlling for natural resources and other sources of cross-country differences
in the output share of physical capital, the global output gains from reallocating physical capital
across countries are negligible. We show that a better measurement of the rents of natural
resources overturns this global efficiency result. We find that global output gains from physical
capital reallocation are large: roughly five times larger than previous estimates. Additionally,
a number of salient global and regional patterns for the misallocation of physical and human
capital arise. This paper explores those patterns and assesses the extent to which they can be
accounted for by observed changes in distortionary policies across the countries over time.
For each country in our sample (indexed by j), we construct estimates of the output shares
of natural resources, φRj,t, based solely on rent flow data for the country in each period t. For
some of the years, we can directly use the rent measures constructed by the World Bank (WB).
To extend the estimates for the years from 1970 to 2005, we apply the same methodology used
by the WB using data from the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization database
(FAOSTAT) and the rent share estimates for benchmark countries from the World Bank. Over
the sample period, we find that an average share of 6.0% over countries and over years. There is
substantial heterogeneity. As expected, the natural resource output shares can be quite high for
1See Caselli (2005), Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) and references therein.
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a handful of oil-producing countries, with an average above 25%. More interestingly, the average
share is higher for poorer countries. Excluding oil producing countries, the average share for the
poorest quartile of countries is 5.7%, while it is only 0.58% for the richest quartile of countries.
We use our estimates of the output shares of natural resources with the labor income shares,
denoted θj,t, and output Yj,t, capital Kj,t, and other data from the Penn World Table (PWT 8.0)
to compute capital output shares, φKj,t = 1−φ
R
j,t−θj,t, and corrected measures of marginal products
of physical and human capital (MPK and MPH). We consider two concepts of marginal products.
The first one is simply the physical or quantity marginal products that applies to reallocation
experiments with “zero gravity”, in which all barriers are removed and all prices are equalized
across countries. The second concept is the revenue or value marginal product and incorporates
differences in output and input prices. For instance, for physical capital, the differences in output
and capital prices, P Yj,t/P
K
j,t, observed across countries and over time may be the result of tech-
nology (the cost of installing capital) or distortions (legislation on labor practices);2 the quantity
and value MPKs are defined as QMPKj,t = φ
K
j,tYj,t/Kj,t and VMPKj,t = QMPKj,tP
Y
j,t/P
K
j,t,
respectively. For human capital, we construct the equivalent measures for MPH, imputing series
of real wages from the data as explained below.
We first consider the allocation of physical capital. We start by characterizing the behavior
of MPKs over time and across countries. A number of clear patterns arise. First, we show that
the median MPK has trended down over the entire sample period 1970-2005. It is particularly
noteworthy that the global upward trend in the capital income shares, φKj,t, has been outpaced
by the increasing capital-to-output ratio,Kj,t/Yj,t, during the sample period.
3 Second, there
is a substantial and persistent dispersion in the MPKs across countries. Despite finding that
countries with low K/Y also tend to have low capital output shares of output, the data suggest
the presence of barriers to the formation of capital of some countries, especially the poorer ones.
This finding holds for both QMPK and VMPK, so relative price corrections alone cannot explain
cross-country differences in the return to capital. Third, the dispersion in both notions of MPKs
decreased substantially between 1970 and the mid-1980s.
To assess the implied level of global capital misallocation—and how its behavior has changed
over time—we conduct counterfactuals of equating the QMPK and VMPK across countries
subject to the same amount of global capital as measured in the data. Two major findings
arise. First, we find a large amount of global capital misallocation, ranging from around 5%
of global output in the early 1970s to a rather stable level around 2% since the 1990s. Our
numbers are always significantly different from zero and robust to the alternative measure of
MPK, the sample of countries, and are unlikely to arise from measurement errors in the output
and capital of countries.4 To put our results in perspective, the global output gains are 2.52%
in 1996, which is five times the global output gains in Caselli and Feyrer (2007). Interestingly,
2This notion recognizes the fact that the output and capital prices differ across countries, as emphasized by
Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
3This is consistent with the global labor share decline documented in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
4Specifically, our MPKs are strongly related to the observable policies (see Section 4.2). We also dispel the
possibility that measurement errors in a frictionless benchmark can account for the observed heterogeneity in
observed MPKs and implied deadweight losses unless those measurement errors are implausibly large as argued
in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) (see Appendix).
3
for some countries and years (e.g., China in the 1970s), the individual country losses from the
implied capital wedges are at par with the cost of misallocation for India and China (Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009). In 1970, the elimination of all frictions to physical capital would have doubled
the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South America or sextupled the GDP of Africa. For
2005, the global gains would still suffice to more than double the GDP for the latter group. The
implied global gains from removing barriers to capital are comparable to the other gains from
openness studied in the literature. For international trade, Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014)
report that, according to the basic models, moving from the current level of tariffs to a globally
uniform tariff of 40%, the average country would lose between 1% and 2% of real income. For
foreign direct investment (FDI), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) obtain global gains of 1.1%
when barriers to FDI to developing countries are removed.5
A second major finding is a global movement toward efficiency from the 1970s to the mid-
1980s. We show that such global movement is indeed associated with the worldwide movement
toward market liberalization and openness observed during that period (Buera et al., 2011).
Specifically, we show that according to an extended Sachs and Warner (1995) indicator, the
countries with more interventionist polices (such as trade restrictions, price controls, limited
convertibility, and heavy government appropriation) exhibited higher implied wedges in their
MPKs according to our model. Much of the global improvement in the allocation of capital takes
place when most countries switch to market-oriented regimes. Yet, we also find an indication of
a narrowing gap in the wedges for some of the remaining interventionist countries, most notably
China and India. To reinforce this finding, we show that capital accumulation closely follows
the behavior of the MPKs of countries. Specifically, we find that the initial levels of MPK and
the growth of their underlying factors (human capital, augmented TFP, relative price of capital
and factor shares) can explain up to 90 percent of the cross-country variation in the growth of
physical capital during the sample period. Consistent with the work of Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013) and Ohanian et al. (2013), our results indicate that external capital flows are not driving
the world toward an efficient allocation of physical capital. Instead, the internal accumulation
of capital closely follows the countries’ MPKs and may be the culprit for the apparent inaction
and misallocation of external flows.
Physical capital is far from the most interesting aspect of global misallocation. A simple
efficiency benchmark consisting of equating the human capital Hj,t of countries, QMPHj,t =
θj,tYj,t/Hj,t, leads to global losses an order of magnitude higher from the misallocation of human
capital relative to that for physical capital. Thus, our findings resemble those in Klein and
Ventura (2009) and Kennan (2013), using different models, countries and data. At any rate,
the barriers to reallocating human capital (workers) seem to be more stringent than those for
physical capital. Some of the barriers are natural, such as the emotional cost of reallocating
human beings across countries with different language, culture and values. Yet, other barriers
must exist because of legislation, mainly in more developed countries, where the inflow of foreign
workers would reduce wages. In fact, the implied global output gains are in the range of 40% to
5For both trade and FDI, the gains could be significantly higher in models that incorporate intermediate goods,
technology spillovers, and the diffusion of nonrival factors. However, introducing the features in our model will
also enhance the implied global gains for improving the allocation of physical and human capital.
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50% (with an upward trend) but would come at the cost of drastic reductions in the wage rate
(per unit of human capital) in developed countries.
To appraise the potential gains in global output without the negative impact on the native
workers of developed countries, we construct policy counterfactuals that are constrained so that
the real wages of workers must be kept constant (at the implied levels from the data.) By design,
if workers were the only factor that could be reallocated across countries, no reallocation would
take place and global gains would be zero. However, if both human and physical capital could
be reallocated, even under such a conservative exercise, the global gains would be substantially
higher than reallocating physical capital alone, around 8% to 9% of global output in the 1970s
and up to 6% by the 2000s. Interestingly, the reallocation is largely from the richer and poorer
countries (first and fourth income quartiles) toward the middle ones (second and third income
quartiles.)
A proper assessment of global misallocation considers both human and physical capital. The
complementarity between these two factors plays a role as they must be directed toward the
countries with higher fixed productivity, either because of TFP or natural resources. Observed
allocations deviate from such an alignment. More interestingly, if human and physical capital
can be reallocated jointly, the direction of the physical capital flows can be reverted relative to
the case when physical capital is the only mobile factor. In fact, the premise that capital should
flow from rich to poor countries is unwarranted: When both factors are reallocated, capital and
labor would flow from some of the poor and middle-income countries toward some of the richer
countries. This simple yet often ignored point could be one of the keys to understanding the
consequences of alternative integration schemes with or without labor mobility for countries and
regions with different productivities and fixed endowments (e.g. the US and Puerto Rico and
the European Community one one side with NAFTA on the other).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our measurement of rents for
natural resources. Section 3 presents our organizing model framework. Section 4 describes the
behavior of MPKs across countries and policy regimes over time. Sections 5 and 6 examine
the allocation of physical capital, and Section 7 does so for human capital. Section 8 shows
that domestic accumulation and not internal flows account for the observed trends. Section 9
concludes. The appendices contain numerous extensions, comparisons, and additional details.
2 Natural Resources and Output Factor Shares
Growth models most often abstract from natural resources as factors of production. Such an
abstraction is of little consequence for most developed countries. However, in this we show section
that natural resources remain a substantial aspect of production in some developing countries.
Accounting for the rents to the owners of natural resources can lead to nonnegligible changes on
the imputed physical capital share of output and its marginal product in some countries, and,
in the end, the assessment of inefficiencies in the allocation of physical and human capital across
countries.
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2.1 The Rents of Natural Resources
A fairly diverse group of factors of production are not relocatable across countries. Most of
these resources can be interpreted as “natural resources”. We estimate the payments to the
rents accrued by natural resources across countries and over time. The WB’s project Where
is the Wealth of Nations? (World-Bank, 2006), and its sequel,The Changing Wealth of Nations
(Bank, 2011), classify natural resources into (a) energy and mineral (subsoil) resources; (b) timber
resources, (c) croplands and (d) pasturelands.6 We adopt this grouping, but also follow Caselli
and Feyrer (2007) by adding an additional category, (e) urban land, also as a non-relocatable
resource across countries.
For each different natural resource, the WB provides direct estimates of the rate of return
using a set of benchmark countries. With these benchmark estimates the WB extrapolates the
rents for each natural resource for an extended sample of countries.7 We further extend the
sample of countries using data from the United Nations’ FAOSTAT database.8 Our estimates
cover all years from 1970 to 2005. The final objective of the WB’s project is to estimate the
stocks of wealth of countries. In our calculations we only use their rent flow estimates, and
not their wealth stocks estimates. Indeed, as we show extensively in Appendix B, factor share
estimates based on wealth stocks overestimate the importance of natural resources, especially for
developing countries.
We now explain how we estimate the factor shares for all natural resource items (a)-(e).
First, the rents for (a) energy and mineral (subsoil) resources (which include oil, natural gas,
coal nickel, lead bauxite, copper, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver, iron and gold) were taken directly
from the WB estimates. Second, the rents for (b) timber were also taken directly from the WB.9
Third, we construct our own estimates for the rents for items (c) and (d), crop and pasture lands,
respectively. For croplands (which includes apples, bananas, coffee, grapes, maize, oranges, rice,
soybeans, wheat, and many others), we follow the World-Bank (2006)’s methodology: For each
crop, the WB estimates the average rate of return to the land for a set of countries that are
major producers of that crop. The cropland rents are equal to output net of intermediate goods,
retribution to labor, physical capital, and other factors. The rate of return to the land is then
computed as the ratio of total land rents and all the land used in producing this crop.10 We
apply those crop-specific rates of return to the quantities reported in FAOSTAT using the U.S.
prices for each crop as proxies for their respective international prices.11 For each country and
6The WB includes non-timber forest resources and protected areas in the calculation of the estimated countries’
stock of natural wealth (World-Bank, 2006; Bank, 2011). We do not include these in our computation of natural
rents since they are almost certainly omitted in the GDP accounting of most countries, if not all of them. In any
event, the rents for these two items are orders of magnitude smaller than the other categories.
7The Wealth of Nations dataset is available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/wealth-of-nations.
8Available at http://faostat.fao.org/, respectively.
9Both are available at http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/subsoil and forest rents.xls.
10For example, rental rates estimated for some benchmark countries are: 27% for soybeans (from China, Brazil,
Argentina); 8% for coffee (from Nicaragua, Peru, Vietnam, Costa Rica); 42% for bananas (from Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Martinique, Suriname, Yemen); etc.
11In earlier versions of The Wealth of Nations database, the WB used export unit values to value agricultural
output. While export values might be poor predictors of output value when the country’s markets are not well
connected to the world market, their use to measure output was partly due to the lack of country-specific producer
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year, we compute the overall rental rate for croplands as the average rate weighted by the land
area used for each crop. Total rents are computed using the estimated weighted rate to total
quantities reported in FAOSTAT. For the rents of pasturelands (which include beef, lamb, milk,
and wool) we follow the World-Bank (2006) by estimating that 45% of the total value of output
from FAOSTAT accrues as rents to land. Last, we follow the World-Bank (2006) and Caselli and
Feyrer (2007) and estimate that the rents of (e) urban land are equal to 24% of the total rents
of physical capital, whose estimates are discussed in the next subsection. While the valuation
of urban lands may depend on aspects substantially different from other natural resources, their
rents should neither be associated with labor nor physical capital earnings. Therefore, for our
purposes they are best seen as factors of productions that are not easily relocatable across
countries.
With these estimates, the natural resources rents for each country j in period t, NRRj,t, is
given by the sum of all rents from items timber, subsoil, cropland, pastureland and urban land
for that country and year:
NRRj,t =
∑
q
rentsq,j,t,
where q = {a, b, c, d, e} are the different forms of non-relocatable capital types, as indexed above.
For our analysis, we need these rents as a fraction of the country’s GDP. Since these rents are
computed in current Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in millions of 2005USD, then the output
share of natural resources for country j in period t is simply
φRj,t ≡
NRRj,t
Yj,t
, (1)
where Yj,t, is the country’s GDP. To compute φ
R
j,t, and for all other purposes, we use the vari-
able cgdpo production-side real GDP at current PPPs (in millions of 2005USD) from the PWT
8.0.12 Our benchmark final sample consists of 79 countries (see Appendix A.1) with consistently
available information on natural resources throughout the entire sample period from 1970 to
2005.13 Later, for the reallocation exercises, the sample is restricted to 76 countries because of
the availability of human capital data.
For our purposes, it is important to compare the behavior of the share φRj,t across development
levels. To this end, Table 1 presents the output shares of the different natural resources for the
year 2000. With the exceptions of oil/natural gas and urban land, the natural resources shares
of output co-move negatively with the countries income per worker, as shown in the last column.
prices for agricultural products. More recently, FAOSTAT has started to provide regular coverage of producer
prices/gross value of production, and the newest version of The Wealth of Nations values crop production using
the newly available producer prices, which tend to be lower than export values (we thank Esther Naikal at the
WB for this insight). We compare new pricing strategies of the World Bank with ours that uses US prices as
proxies for crop international prices in the Appendix A. We find very similar quantitative results.
12Since we focus on country-specific scales of operation to conduct a global reallocation exercise, we focus on
the output measure cgdpo from PWT which reflects the production capacity of a country.
13Section A.3 presents a further analysis for a larger sample countries with consistent data for 2005.
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In 2000, the correlation between the total share of natural resources and the countries’ per
capita output levels is −0.07 for the whole sample, but it is much more negative, −0.67, for
the sample that excludes oil-exporting countries. Disaggregating across natural resources, we
find that income per worker is negatively related to the share of output attributed to timber
forest with a correlation coefficient of −0.29, subsoil resources other than oil and gas, −0.21;
pastureland, −0.27; and, in particular, cropland, −0.55.
Table 1: Natural Resources Shares of Output (%, 2000)
Coefficient
Mean Median of variation ρx,y
Natural Resources: 8.19 4.01 1.44 -0.07
⊲ Timber 0.13 0 3.76 -0.29
⊲ Subsoil: 5.44 0.73 2.1 0.17
Oil 4.03 0.06 2.42 0.15
Gas 1.21 0.1 2.44 0.19
Other 0.28 0 2.79 -0.21
⊲ Cropland 2.26 1.06 1.47 -0.55
⊲ Pastureland 0.36 0.17 1.53 -0.27
Natural resources with urban land 17.7 14.7 0.62 -0.1
Obs. 79 79 79 79
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAOSTAT.
Disregarding urban land, the largest component of rents generated from natural capital are
subsoil resources. For example, in 2000, they accounted an average of 5.44% of output, with oil
and natural gas the major components, representing 4.03% and 1.21% of output, respectively.
The second major component of natural resources is cropland with a share of output of 2.26%.
Pasture land rents and rents from timber forest account for lower shares, respectively, 0.36%
and 0.13% of output on average. Excluding the main oil-exporting countries in our sample, the
median share of oil rents in terms of output dramatically drops to 0.02% (i.e., close to 3% of
its mean value), while the median share of cropland rents drops to 1.06% (i.e., about 53% of its
mean value). This suggests a large dispersion in oil shares across countries, which is confirmed by
a large coefficient of variation in the third column for oil, 1.6 times larger than that of cropland
shares. For non-oil exporting countries, the largest subcategory is cropland rents, which account
for 2.01% on average, with subsoil rents being 1.25% on average. For non-oil countries, the
median share of natural resources in output is now close to the mean—the mean-to-median ratio
is 1.40; this ratio is 2.04 when oil countries are included. For the non-oil sample, the coefficient
of variation in the share is 1.08, while for the entire sample with oil countries it is 1.44.14
14We find similar patterns with a larger sample of 122 countries for which φRj,t are available from 1990 to 2005.
Results available upon request.
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Figure 1: Natural Resources (Excluding Urban Land) Output Shares, 2000
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Figure 2: Average Output Share of Natural Resources
(By Income quartiles; non-oil-exporting countries)
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Figure 1 further illustrates the relationship between the output share of natural resources
(excluding urban land) and income per worker also for the year 2000. The left panel singles out
the oil-exporting countries (marked in red), which we define as those with subsoil shares of output
above 10%,15 Oil-exporting countries have much higher φRj,t, averaging 36.80%, versus 4.51%
of their non-oil-exporting counterparts and relatively richer than their non-oil counterparts.16
The right panel focuses on non-oil countries, shows a negative relationship between the natural
resources share and output. For non-oil countries with income per worker above $40,000 in 2000,
the natural resources share of output is only 1.13%. The average of this share is much higher,
6.90%, for countries with income per worker below $40,000 and 9.62% for countries with income
per worker below $10,000.17 In other terms, the bottom 20% poorest countries in income per
worker have a natural resources share of their output that is 8.81 times larger than the natural
share of the top 20% richest countries in income per worker.18
Figure 2 shows that these cross-sectional patterns are persistent over time. The figure shows
the average shares for each different quartile of countries, as ordered by their GDP per capita,
for each year from 1970 until 2005. The figure excludes oil-exporting countries, which display a
higher and increasing shares. In general, the figure shows clearly that for developed countries
(fourth quartile) and higher-income developing countries (third quartile) the output share of
natural resources is low and relatively constant, around 1% over the sample years. However, the
share is significantly higher for the other half of the countries in the sample (quartiles 1 and
2.) This is particularly stronger by the end of the sample, when natural resources consistently
accounted for more than 8% of the income of the countries in the poorest quartile.
2.2 Output Share of Labor and Physical Capital
We now explain how we incorporate our estimates of the factor shares for natural resources for
the computation of the output shares for capital and labor. We denote by θj,t the labor share of
output. In this paper, we use the PWT variable labsh. This measure of the labor share aims to
correct for the part of ambiguous income, mainly proprietors’ income (i.e., the self-employed),
that needs to be attributed to labor income in order to avoid underestimating the contribution
of labor to output. This is a particularly relevant issue in countries in which a significant amount
of labor is allocated to family-owned farms and various forms of self-employment.19
In the PWT, as explained in Feenstra et al. (2015), the raw labor share, defined as the ratio
of unambiguous compensation of employees (WN) to GDP, θj,t = WN/GDP, is adjusted using
15These countries are Bahrain, Ecuador, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad
and Tobago. Venezuela is not included in our sample due to incomplete information on oil earnings for the most
recent years.
16The income per worker of oil-exporting countries averages $51,888, while that of non-oil-exporting countries
is $4,963. That is, the non-oil-exporting countries include a relatively larger share of poor countries.
17In this context, and as external validation, it is reassuring that our estimates for cropland rents in poor
countries are comparable to those attained from new micro representative farm production data in de Magalhaes
and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2015) and Restuccia and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2015).
18Including oil-exporting countries this factor drops to 1.63.
19See Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Gollin (2002).
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an algorithm along four different ways to compute ambiguous income (AMB) to select their
best estimate of θj,t, a choice that basically depends on the availability of data on ambiguous
income.20 As we discuss below, the resulting values for θj,t from the PWT 8.0 are lower that
those in Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001). Some, but far from all, of the differences are driven
by the sample of countries. In the interest of expanding our sample of countries and periods as
much as possible, we take the measures from the PWT 8.0 as our benchmark.21
For the output share of physical capital, denoted here by φKj,t, the standard practice is to
equate it to 1 minus the labor share. All non-labor income must be capital income, an assumption
driven by a constant returns to scale production function with only physical and human capital
as factors. Instead, as proposed by Caselli and Feyrer (2007), correctly accounting for the income
shares of natural capital factors, the physical capital share should be calculated as
φKj,t = 1− θj,t − φ
R
j,t. (2)
This avoids inflating income and the return to physical capital.
3 The Model
We first set out our baseline model and derive the efficiency benchmarks needed to evaluate the
degrees of misallocation of mobile factors across countries.
3.1 The Baseline Environment
Consider a world economy, populated by an arbitrary number J of countries, indexed by j =
1, 2, ..., J . Given our data, we index the (yearly) time periods by t = 1970, 1971, ...2005. Our
baseline model assumes a single tradable good, which can be consumed or invested across all the
countries. In each country, output is produced using the service flows of the country’s stocks
of physical capital , Kj,t, natural resources (land and other natural resources), Tj,t, and human
capital-augmented labor, Hj,t = hj,tLj,t, where Lj,t indicates the number of workers in country
j in period t and hj,t their average skills or human capital. Production in the country is also a
function of the country’s overall TFP, Aj,t.
20The PWT considers four different adjustments: (i) Add AMB to unambiguous labor compensation, resulting
in θj,t = (WN+AMB)/GDP; (ii) Assume the labor share, θj,t, is identical to the labor share of unambiguous
output, θj,t = WN/(GDP-AMB); (iii) If proxies for the number of employees (N) and self-employed (SE) are
available, then assuming the same average wage for both leads to a labor share is θj,t = (WN/GDP)*(N+SE)/N;
(iv) Add the value added in agriculture (AGRI) to unambiguous labor income (i.e., θ = (WN+AGRI)/GDP).
The PWT 8.0 constructs its “best estimate” of the labor share using the following procedure: If the unadjusted
share is larger than 0.7, no adjustments are used, as the share never excess 0.66 when ambiguous income data are
available in national accounts statistics. If the unadjusted share is smaller than 0.7, then if ambiguous income data
are available, they use adjustment (ii) because adjustment (i) seems too extreme. Otherwise, if the ambiguous
income data are not available, then use the minimum of the resulting shares of adjustments (iii) and (iv).
21Table B-2 in the Appendix shows that our choice of labor share is not the main driver of our results.
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Our baseline model stems from the standard one-sector growth model, assuming that produc-
tion of the good in country j at time t is Cobb-Douglas. Specifically, we consider a production
function of Yj,t in the form
Yj,t = Aj,t(K
γj,t
j,t T
1−γj,t
j,t )
1−θj,t(Hj,t)
θj,t , (3)
where 0 < θj,t < 1 is the labor share of output. The non-labor share of output, 1−θj,t, is divided
between a share γj,t (1− θj,t) for produced capital, Kj,t, and an output share, (1− γj,t) (1− θj,t)
for natural resources. This specification extends the standard model in two dimensions. First,
it introduces non-produced capital (natural resources) Tj,t. Second, it allows for country-time
variation in the factor shares as documented in the previous section.
Using data on output, Yj,t, the stock of physical capital, Kj,t, labor shares θj,t, and natural
resources shares, (1− γj,t) (1− θj,t), we can readily compute the “quantity” marginal product of
physical capital (QMPKj,t) as
QMPKj,t = (1− θj,t)γj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
= φKj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
. (4)
Correcting for the output share of non-reallocatable capital (natural resources) leads to significant
differences from the findings in the literature on the degree of misallocation of capital across
countries. The use of the prefix Q in the measures of MPK is for contrast with the ‘value’
counterparts developed below. To gauge the economic relevance of cross-country variations, we
now specify the efficient benchmark with respect to which we can compare the actual allocations.
3.2 The Baseline Efficiency Benchmark
Throughout the paper, we assume exogenously determined sequences of TFPs {Aj,t} and service
flows of natural resources {Tj,t} across countries and over time. Cross-sectional distributions of
these production factors—and their behavior over time—are what they are, and there is nothing
to evaluate. We first take as given the allocation of human capital, Hj,t, across countries and
examine the allocation of the world supply of physical capital, KW,t. Then, in Section 7, we
examine the joint allocation of the world’s physical and human capital. In all the exercises, the
quartet {Aj,t, Tj,t, θj,t, γj,t} for all countries is taken as given. Similarly, for brevity, we group
the fixed factors within a country in a term Zj,t ≡ Aj,tT
(1−γj,t)(1−θj,t)
j,t , that embeds TFP (Aj,t)
and the output contribution of natural resources.
Under the assumption that all output is tradable, the optimal allocation of physical capital
would maximize global output, that is,
Y K
∗
W,t = max
{Kj,t}
J∑
j=1
Zj,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t) (Hj,t)
θj,t , (5)
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subject to not surpassing the world’s supply of capital,
J∑
j=1
Kj,t ≤ KW,t.
Here KW,t ≡
∑J
j=1K
O
j,t where K
O
j,t, is the observed (PWT 8.0) data for the physical capital for
country j in period t.
Naturally, this maximization requires the equalization of the marginal product of physical
capital across all countries to common world factor prices rKt :
QMPKj,t = (1− θj,t)γj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
= γj,t (1− θj,t)Zj,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t)−1 (Hj,t)
θj,t = rKt (6)
for all j and t. In particular, this indicates that countries with higher TFP and/or natural
resources, Zj,t, a higher supply of human capital, Hj,t, and a higher output share of physical
capital, γj,t (1− θj,t), shall receive more physical capital as part of the efficient allocations.
The maximization does not lead to a closed-form solution except when γj,t = γ¯t and θj,t = θ¯t;
when the cross-country heterogeneity in factor shares disappears.22 Although there is not closed-
form solution using the heterogeneous values of {θj,t, γj,t}, finding the value Y
K∗
W,t numerically is
straightforward. In any event, we assess the degree of global capital misallocation according to the
global efficiency loss ln
[
Y K
∗
W,t/Y
O
W,t
]
—that is, the percentage difference between the maximized
global output and Y OW,t, the sum of the country outputs observed in the data.
3.3 A Benchmark with Prices
Relative prices of capital goods have been highlighted as key to accounting for differences in
investment rates (see, e.g., Hsieh and Klenow (2007)), and for differences in the marginal product
of capital (see, e.g., Caselli and Feyrer (2007). Since both of these aspects are closely related
to our exercise, we incorporate cross-country differences in the relative prices of capital in our
analysis.
When the dollar price of output P Yj,t and of capital P
K
j,t are different across countries, the
“value” marginal product of capital, VMPKj,t (i.e., the value of the return to investing in
22In more detail, if factor shares are identical across countries, then the maximized output is equal to
Y K
∗
W,t =

 J∑
j=1
[
Aj,tT
(1−γ¯t)(1−θ¯t)
j,t (Hj,t)
θ¯t
] 1
1−γ(1−θ¯t)


1−γ¯t(1−θ¯t)
(KW,t)
γ¯t(1−θ¯t) .
13
capital in country j in period t) is
VMPKj,t =
P Yj,t
PKj,t
(1− θj,t)γj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
. (7)
Differences in PKj,t across countries lead to different numbers of machines per dollar invested,
1/PKj,t, while differences in P
Y
j,t lead to revenue differences for the same units of return physical
output. In a world in which investors can freely adjust their portfolios, VMPKj,t would be the
criterion for investment across countries, not the quantity QMPKj,t as defined in equation (4.)
Thus, the relevant disparities to assess world capital market frictions are in terms of VMPKj,t.
An alternative efficiency benchmark that takes
{
P Yj,t,P
K
j,t
}
as given can also be useful to assess
the degree of misallocation of physical capital across countries. Consider an environment in which
output is entirely tradable, but capital entails installment costs. In fact, assume that to install
one unit of capital in country j requires a cost̟j,t = P
K
j,t/P
Y
j,t in units of output goods. Therefore,
in terms of goods, the amount of resources required to install the observed KOj,t in each country
j in period t is given by
(
PKj,t/P
Y
j,t
)
KOj,t. In our benchmark with prices, we would like to compare
the world output production relative to the optimized one given KNW,t ≡
∑J
j=1
PKj,t
PYj,t
KOj,t, the total
amount of goods invested across all countries.
Then, our second benchmark is based on the distance of current output with the upper
bound for the maximized world’s output (5), but subject to the current global used of resources
for physical capital,
J∑
j=1
PKj,t
P Yj,t
Kj,t ≤ K
N
W,t. (8)
The optimality conditions required the cross-country equalization of the price-corrected marginal
product of physical capital, that is,
VMPKj,t = R
K
t
=
P Yj,t
PKj,t
(1− θj,t)γj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
=
P Yj,t
PKj,t
γj,t (1− θj,t)Aj,tT
(1−γj,t)(1−θj,t)
j,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t)−1 (Hj,t)
θj,t . (9)
Under this benchmark, prices also determine the allocation of capital for each country. The
higher (lower) the relative price of output (capital) in a country, P Yj,t/P
K
j,t, the more physical
capital should be allocated to it. For future reference, we will denote by
µKj,t ≡
(
PKj,t/P
Y
j,t
)
Kj,t
KNW,t
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the share of the world’s investment in physical capital that is allocated to country j in period t.
When factor shares differ across countries, neither Y K
∗
W,t nor µ
K
j,t can be solved for in closed form.
However, they are easily computed numerically.
4 The Marginal Product of Capital
We now compute the implied marginal products of physical capital MPK. We use the factor
share data described in Section 2, along with PWT 8.0 measures of output, physical capital
measures, and the prices of output and capital goods.23
In particular, the capital stocks in each country/year, Kj,t, are taken as the variable ck, capital
stocks at current PPPs (also in millions of 2005USD).24 The number of workers in each country
and year, Lj,t, is measured with the variable emp in PWT 8.0 for our measure of aggregate labor—
that is, the number of persons (in millions) engaged in production. To estimate the human capital
of the country, we use the variable hc in the PWT 8.0; the index of human capital per person,
based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 2013); and returns to education (Psacharopoulos,
1994). We use that variable to define hj,t for each country and then the aggregate human capital-
augmented labor is Hj,t =emp×hc. For the price of output, P
Y
j,t, we use the GDP deflator pl gdpo;
that is, the price level of cgdpo (PPP/XR, normalized so that the price level of USA GDP in
2005 = 1). The price level of capital, PKj,t, is taken to be pl k, the price level of the capital
stock (normalized so that the price for United States in 2005 = 1). Finally, for the price level
of consumption, P cj,t, we use the variable pl c, the price level of household consumption (also
normalized so that the price for the United States in 2005 = 1). Next, we describe the behavior
of our MPK measures across time and space. Then we relate our MPK measures to observable
policies.
4.1 Across Space and Across Time
The panels in Figure 3 present the distribution, across countries, of the quantity and value MPKs
over the entire sample period. A number of relevant patterns emerge from these figures. First,
the median values of both panels exhibit a clear downward trend, suggesting that capital might
have been accumulated across most countries at a faster pace than potential changes in the factor
shares. Second, the dispersion of the MPKs has steadily decreased over the sample period. Third,
the most dramatic declines in the median and dispersion of MPKs take place in the 1970s to
mid-1980s. Fourth, even though some important differences remain, the aforementioned patterns
are common across both QMPK and VMPK, indicating that none of them are driven by the
23Available online at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table; see also Appendix.
24For each country, these aggregate stocks are computed applying the perpetual inventory method separately
for different types of investment that include structures (residential and nonresidential), equipment (separately
for transportation, computers and communication), software, and other machinery and assets. Differences in the
composition of investment flows lead to differences in aggregate investment prices and depreciation rates. See the
detailed discussion in Feenstra et al. (2015), including a comparison with previous PWT datasets.
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Figure 3: Global Evolution of MPKs
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from the median) we show the interquartile (25th-75th percentile) range, the 10th-90th percentile range, and the
5th-95th percentile range.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAOSTAT.
relative price of capital to goods across countries. However, the relative price of capital drives
significant and persistent differences in levels. For instance, while the median QMPK is about
20 percent in 1970, the VMPK for that year is about 25 percent.
To explore the forces driving the trends in the cross-country dispersion of MPKs, we now
explore the variance decomposition of the logs of QMPKj,t and VMPKj,t. It is straightforward
to show that we can decompose those variances in terms of the variance of the (logs) of physical
capital output shares, output-to-capital ratios, and the relative price of capital:
var [lnQMPKj,t] = var
[
lnφKj,t
]
+ var
[
ln
Yj,t
Kj,t
]
+ 2cov
[
lnφKj,t, ln
Yj,t
Kj,t
]
,
and
var [lnVMPKj,t] = var [lnQMPKj,t] + var
[
ln
P Yj,t
PKj,t
]
+ 2cov
[
lnQMPKj,t, ln
P Yj,t
PKj,t
]
.
The left side of Table 2 shows the variances of the different objects, while the right side presents
their pairwise covariances. First, note that there is a downward trend in the dispersion for both
lnQMPKj,t and lnVMPKj,t; for the former, the negative trend runs from 1970 until 2000, while
for the latter it runs from 1975 until 2000. Second, these downward trends are mostly driven
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Table 2: Decomposition of the dispersion of QMPK and VMPK
Variances (logs of each variable) Covariances (logs of each variable)
Year QMPKj,t VMPKj,t φ
K
j,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
PYj,t
PKj,t
φKj,t,
Yj,t
Kj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
,
PYj,t
PKj,t
φKj,t,
PYj,t
PKj,t
QMPKj,t,
PYj,t
PKj,t
1970 0.367 0.147 0.089 0.223 0.161 0.027 -0.160 -0.030 -0.190
1980 0.257 0.174 0.084 0.166 0.062 0.004 -0.073 0.000 -0.073
1990 0.214 0.158 0.065 0.154 0.079 -0.002 -0.074 0.006 -0.068
2000 0.189 0.119 0.071 0.163 0.117 -0.023 -0.114 0.021 -0.093
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAOSTAT.
by both a significant decline in the variation of the log of the output-to-capital ratio Yj,t/Kj,t
and a decline in the covariance between log-φKj,t and log-Yj,t/Kj,t. With respect to the former,
the contribution of var
[
ln
Yj,t
Kj,t
]
to the variance of log QMPKj,t increases from 61% in 1970 to
82% in 2000. With respect to the covariance of lnφKj,t and ln
Yj,t
Kj,t
, we find that it changes sign
between 1970 and 2000. Therefore, from a world in the 1970s where countries with a more capital
intensive technology (i.e. high φKj,t) were exhibiting relatively lower accumulation of capital (i.e.,
higher Yj,t/Kj,t), in the year 2000 we have switched to a world where the more capital-intensive
countries are also endowed with relatively more capital. This switch is quantitatively important.
In 1970, this covariance enhanced the variation in lnQMPKj,t by 14%. By the end of the sample,
it was reducing it by a similar magnitude.
A third finding is that between 1970 and 2000, the variation in the log of the capital-income
shares φKj,t has a positive but mildly declining contribution on the variance of log QMPKj,t. Its
contribution lies in a range between 20% and 33%. Factor intensity differences are relevant, but
they are the main drivers of the dispersion in the MPK.
We finally explore some simple results from Table 2 on the role of the relative price of capital,
P Yj,t/P
K
j,t, in the behavior of VMPKj,t. First, the dispersion of lnQMPKj,t is always significantly
higher than the dispersion in lnVMPKj,t. In the extreme, in 1970, var [lnQMPKj,t] is almost 2.5
times the value var [lnVMPKj,t], but this ratio is never below 1.38. This is just a manifestation
of the strongly negative correlation between prices and physical marginal products. Indeed, the
correlation between lnP Yj,t/P
K
j,t and lnQMPKj,t is always between −0.54 and −0.77. Clearly,
prices are partially correcting the cross-sectional dispersion in the physical MPK, and countries
with highQMPKs tend to also have a higher relative cost of installing capital or a relatively lower
value of their output (i.e. a low lnP Yj,t/P
K
j,t). However, despite the fact that the countermovement
of prices with lnQMPK can easily overturn by itself the dispersion in lnVMPK (i.e., the
contribution of 2cov
[
lnQMPK, lnP Yj,t/P
K
j,t
]
/var [lnVMPK] is often 100%), this covariance is
far from enough to offset the joint dispersion of prices lnP Yj,t/P
K
j,t and the physical lnQMPK. As
a matter of fact, the values for both the physical lnQMPK and lnVMPK are always strongly,
positively correlated across countries. Their correlation is as high as 0.87 (in 1975) and never
below 0.64 (in 2000).
In sum, while the relative price of capital partially offsets the dispersion of physical MPKs,
these prices are far from eliminating cross-country dispersion (in any point in time) and are not
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driving the downward trend in dispersion observed between 1970 and 2005. Even after controlling
for the countries’ differences in their capital intensity in production and in their observed relative
prices of physical capital, there remains a nonnegligible dispersion in the marginal product of
physical capital across countries. The overall message from our results is that, despite a downward
trend from the early 1970s, there are still significant and persistent distortions in the allocation
of capital.
4.2 Relation to Observable Policies
This section briefly explores whether the implied distortions can be related to directly observable
measures of policy distortions. To this end, we use a simple indicator, the Sachs and Warner
(1995) openness {0, 1} indicator (hereafter SW). Specifically, SW require the following five criteria
to classify a country as “open”: (i) The average tariff rate on imports is below 40%; (ii) Non-tariff
barriers cover less than 40% of imports; (iii) The country is not a socialist economy (according to
the definition of Kornai (2000)); (iv) The state does not hold a monopoly of the major exports;
(v) The black market premium is below 20%. The resulting indicator is a dichotomic variable.
If in a given year a country satisfies all five criteria, SW call it open and set the indicator to 1.
Otherwise, the indicator takes the value of 0.
While originally SW aimed to design their indicator to classify countries as being open or
closed to international trade, the inclusion of criteria (iii) and (iv) allows them to capture forms
of government intervention that clearly extend much further beyond restrictions on international
trade. Several authors have argued that this indicator is better interpreted as an overall measure
toward market friendly versus interventionist policies. In the words of Rodriguez and Rodrik
(2000), “[The] SW indicator serves as a proxy for a wide range of policy and institutional differ-
ences,” where “trade liberalization is usually just one part of a government’s overall reform plan
for integrating an economy with the world system. Other aspects of such a program almost always
include price liberalization, budget restructuring, privatization, deregulation, and the installation
of a social safety net.” In a similar vein, Hall and Jones (1999) use the SW indicator as a proxy
for the quality of social infrastructure. Likewise, Buera et al. (2011) use it as an indicator for
the adoption of market-oriented versus government interventionist policies. As do these authors,
we interpret SW as an indicator not only of barriers to the entry and exit of physical capital,
but also to the domestic formation of human and physical capital. To be sure, the black mar-
ket premium is always joined by many other forms of financial market distortions. Moreover, a
socialist government or a government that monopolizes major exports is most likely also a good
proxy for government rents that depress the accumulation and/or the effective use of human and
physical capital in a country.
Obviously, a dichotomic indicator is at best a stark one and will miss some important liber-
alizations. Countries with very different degrees of state intervention (e.g. the U.S and France)
may end up being classified equally. Moreover, the indicator fails to capture reforms if they
do not simultaneously move countries in all five criteria (e.g., China in later years). Indeed, it
classifies both India and China as closed economies despite recent notable changes in their policy
regimes. The main advantage of the SW indicator is the provision of a simple indicator that is
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Table 3: The MPK of Open and Closed Economies: 5-Year Averages (1970-2000)
Year QMPKj,t VMPKj,t Obs.
Open Closed t-stat Open Closed t-stat Open Closed
1970 - 1975 0.152 0.236 8.39 0.206 0.261 5.80 196 206
1976 - 1980 0.131 0.200 7.84 0.172 0.213 4.87 168 167
1981 - 1985 0.119 0.170 6.32 0.157 0.174 2.16 164 171
1986 - 1990 0.138 0.174 3.70 0.180 0.177 -0.34 207 128
1991 - 1995 0.138 0.185 3.94 0.165 0.195 2.31 294 41
1996 - 2000 0.132 0.235 5.69 0.150 0.186 2.91 310 25
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, FAOSTAT, and Sachs and Warner (1995).
available for most of the country-years in our panel. Richer indicators, are available only for a
reduced sample of countries, a cross-section, or only a handful of recent years.
Table 3 compares the MPK of closed and open countries. It compares the averages of both
QMPK and VMPK for open and closed countries, splitting the sample in 5-year intervals. The
table also presents the t-statistic of a simple test that the average QMPK and VMPK for closed
economies are equal to the averages of open economies. The last columns of the table indicate
the number of country-years in each window of years.
Some simple conclusions follow from Table 3. First, the marginal product of capital in closed
countries is always higher than in open countries. These differences are quantitatively very large
and statistically significant. The only exception is that the average VMPK is higher for open
countries during the 1986 − 1990 subperiod, but that difference is not statistically significant.
Second, the marginal product of capital for closed countries tends to fall over, while that for
open countries remains relatively flat (at lower levels). Third, the number of open countries
drastically increases from 1981 onward. The lower MPK of open countries and a higher fraction
of them drive the overall downward trend in the average marginal product of capital.25 Finally,
we would also like to emphasize that the fact that our MPK are strongly related to the SW
indicator, a good proxy for market-oriented policies (see Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), Hall and
Jones (1999), and Buera et al. (2011)) is reassuring of the low extent of measurement error of
our MPK measures.
Table 4 further explores the drivers of the differences between open and closed countries.
It lists the averages of capital income shares, φKj,t, the average output-to-capital ratio, Yj,t/Kj,t,
and the average output-to-capital price ratio, P Yj,t/P
K
j,t, grouping countries into open and closed
categories. The table also shows the t-statistic for the test of equality of means for each compo-
nent. Our results are highly suggestive of how market-oriented countries differ from closed, state
interventionist countries. Closed, interventionist countries have much higher output-to-capital
ratios than open, market-oriented countries, and these differences are statistically significant. On
25It is worth indicating that essentially the same findings hold if the analysis is done in logarithms as opposed
to levels.
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Table 4: Factor Shares, Output-to-Capital Ratios, and Relative Prices of Open and Closed
Economies: 5-year averages (1970-2000)
Year φKj,t
Yj,t
Kj,t
PYj,t
PKj,t
Open Closed t-stat Open Closed t-stat Open Closed t-stat
1970 - 1975 0.308 0.342 4.11 0.484 0.699 7.84 1.484 1.236 -5.41
1976 - 1980 0.303 0.334 3.40 0.420 0.609 7.84 1.401 1.139 -8.27
1981 - 1985 0.302 0.318 1.83 0.383 0.559 6.42 1.409 1.102 -8.92
1986 - 1990 0.322 0.318 -0.47 0.421 0.562 4.92 1.399 1.084 -8.91
1991 - 1995 0.331 0.324 -0.59 0.420 0.609 5.06 1.272 1.064 -3.92
1996 - 2000 0.333 0.335 0.17 0.407 0.766 5.80 1.197 1.038 -2.56
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, FAOSTAT, and Sachs and Warner (1995).
the other hand, the relative cost of capital is higher in closed countries than in open countries,
suggesting that some of the interventionist policies probably act as a wedge in the cost of invest-
ment goods, which is highly plausible, given the fact that much of the equipment is produced
(and exported) by a handful of industrialized countries (Mutreja et al., 2014). Interestingly, the
capital intensity differences, φKj,t, between open and closed economies are neither large nor statis-
tically significant, especially in the second part of the sample. This finding lends support to our
approach that factor shares are less distorted by policies and barriers than factor accumulation
and the return to production factors.
5 Assessing Global Misallocation
In this section, we present the global output gains of physical capital reallocation. Our results
are summarized in Figure 4, which presents the evolution of quantity and value global gains from
1970 to 2005. We find that global misallocation is large with output gains roughly between 5 and
2 percent for entire sample period. Note that 2 percent global output gains are quantitatively
important. For instance, in this period the total output in South America is around 5 percent
and in Africa is around 2 percent of global output value; that is, if the full 2 percent global gains
(i.e., roughly our minimum) were geared toward Africa, its output size would double. In terms
of accuracy, we find that the global gains we obtain are significantly different from zero; see the
bootstrapped confidence intervals in Table 5. In Appendix B, we further show that our estimates
for global output gains are roughly five times larger and also significantly different from those
obtained by Caselli and Feyrer (2007) who use natural resources stocks to proxy for the natural
resources share of output.
In terms of the evolution of global misallocation, there is an unambiguous movement toward
more efficiency over time. The equalization of quantity MPK yields gains that start at 5.18
percent in 1970 and decrease to 2.43 percent in 1985 (see Table 5). Since the early 1990s, quantity
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Figure 4: Global Output Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation
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Notes: Our results are based on our measures of MPKs computed using natural resources rents, factor shares,
capital, output, and prices as described in section 2. The global output gains are defined as the log difference
between the efficient global output implied by the quantity and value models posed in Section 3 and the actual
global output.
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Table 5: Global Output Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation: Bootstrap Estimates
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Quantity MPK 5.18 4.55 3.13 2.43 2.51 2.47 1.66 2.29
[3.35,8.27] [2.87,6.52] [2.04,4.52] [1.52,3.58] [1.59,3.78] [1.44,4.00] [0.98,2.44] [1.34,3.46]
Value MPK 2.38 4.01 2.56 2.10 2.35 1.79 1.46 1.99
[1.45,3.73] [2.20,6.30] [1.57,3.74] [1.24,3.23] [1.38,3.76] [1.06,2.91] [0.88,2.16] [1.22,3.00]
Notes: The global output gains refer to the median value of 1,000 bootstrap simulations with 100 percent re-
placement. The confidence intervals (in brackets) refer to the 10th and 90th bootstrapped percentiles.
global gains have also declined but at a slower pace: from 2.51 percent in 1990 to 2.29 in 2005.
The equalization of value MPK shows a similar trend pattern, starting with gains that average
3.20 percent during the 1970s and decrease to roughly 2 percent in 2005. Not surprisingly, the
value global gains are always somewhat lower—by an average of 20 percent—than the quantity
global gains, indicating the role of prices in accounting for income differences across countries.26
In addition, for any particular year, quantity and value gains are highly correlated at the country
level.27 We discard the notion that these patterns are driven by measurement error. Instead, as
we now discuss, the global movement toward efficiency is strongly associated with the worldwide
movement towards market-oriented policy regimes as observed since the early 1980s (see also
Appendix C).
5.1 Global Policy Movements and Misallocation
Figure 5 shows the fraction of open countries—that is, those with market-oriented policy regimes
(right scale) and the median of the implied wedges for physical capital (left scale) in market-
oriented countries (blue) and heavily interventionist countries (red.) These wedges were com-
puted as follows: For every year, we compute the allocation of capital resulting from the quantity
and value marginal product of capital and obtain the efficient worldwide MPK∗t . Then, we con-
struct country-specific wedges as: ∆j,t =
MPKoj,t
MPK∗t
, whereMPKoj,t is the observed MPK for country
j in period t according to the quantity and value definitions. The patterns for the averages are
very similar to those for the medians.
Figure 5 shows very clearly that, along the sample period, the world moved toward openness
and market orientation. On the one hand, the number of open countries almost doubled, from just
about 50% of the countries in our sample during the 1970s, and the fraction of market-oriented
countries reached 92.5% by the end of the sample. The most dramatic increment in the share
of market-oriented countries take place during the 1980s. On the other hand, the gap between
the implied wedges of market-oriented and government interventionist countries also declined
26Excluding the year 1970, for which the differences between value and quantity gains are the largest, the gap
between value and quantity gains slightly drops to 15 percent.
27Running a regression of country-specific value gains on quantity gains by year, we find an intercept that
remains very close to 0 and a significant slope coefficient that oscillates between 0.6 and 0.8.
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Figure 5: Wedges and Number of Market-Oriented and Interventionist Countries
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substantially during the 1970s. During the 1980s, the gap completely disappears according to
the quantity benchmark, and becomes negative under the value 1. Such a gap becomes positive
for both cases for the later part of the sample period, but at that point it applies to only a
handful of countries.
Thus, both margins, the number of open countries and the gap in the wedges between closed
and open countries, seem relevant for the global movement toward efficiency. To explore further
how the global movement in policies may drive changes in global misallocation, we perform a
counterfactual simulating how much reallocation would be reduced if all interventionist countries
had adopted market-oriented policies. In particular, Figure 6 compares our estimated global
misallocation with those when all closed countries are assumed to have the median wedge of
market-oriented countries.28 Three main conclusions arise: First, the degree of the degree of
misallocation would have been significantly lower for all years. Second, practically all misallo-
cation would disappear by the end of the sample period. Third, the above conclusions hold for
both the quantity and value benchmarks.
5.2 Distributional Patterns: Regions and Income Levels
Interestingly, the global patterns are quite similar under both quantity and value exercises. In
both gains of capital reallocation vary greatly across countries. Figure 7 shows the distribution
of quantity and value gains for each year from 1970 to 2005. In general, the figures are quite
similar. The white line represents the median, the dark green region the interquartile range, the
lighter green region the 10th-90th percentile range, and the lightest region the 5th-95th percentile
range. The distribution of gains is asymmetric: the percentiles 5th, 10th and 25th are relatively
28Note that the gains in Figure 6 are different from those in 4 because our sample of countries is reduced to 67
countries with information on the SW variable.
23
Figure 6: Counterfactual Gains in a Market-Oriented World
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close to the median and percentile 75th, 90th and 95th are further away. For instance, in 1970
the median quantity gains are around 20 percent, the 5th percentile of gains is around minus 20
percent, and the 95th percentile of gains is more than 80 percent. The median quantity gains
decrease from about 20 percent in 1970 to around 0 in 2005. The pattern for value gains is
similar, but the median gains increase again at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the
2000s.
To characterize the global output gains further, we compute the gains by regions (Figure 8).
Regional differences are striking. First, using the counterfactuals based on QMPK, output gains
in Africa would have been roughly 30 percent in 1970, fallen to 10 by the mid-1990s, and then
climbed to 20 percent in 2005, even when the global gains are in the 2 percent range. For Latin
American and the Caribbean countries (LAC), the gains would also be quite large: 30 percent
in 1970, around 20 percent for most of the years between 1980 and 2000, falling to 10 percent
at the end of the period. Asian countries (excluding Japan) would initially have much larger
gains, around 40 percent in the early 1970s, which is consistent with the findings of Ohanian
et al. (2013); then the gains for the Asian countries would consistently fall down to 10 percent
in 2005, a reflection of the rapid accumulation of capital observed for these countries. Using the
counterfactual with VMPK (i.e. including price differences) would lead to very similar results
for Asia and Latin America. The notable difference is that the gains would be much smaller for
Africa, driven by the relatively high cost of installing capital in those countries. For 2005, both
counterfactuals lead to very similar numbers for almost all regions.
As for developed countries, we find that overall, regardless of using the quantity or value
counterfactuals, developed countries (the US, Canada, Europe, and Oceania) will export capital
and reduce their domestic production, mostly around 10 percent. The notable exception to
this pattern is Japan, which during most years between 1970 and the early 1990s would be a
net recipient of capital. These high MPK values for Japan reflect the fast growth experienced
by the country during the first 25 years in our sample. Then, from the early 1990s onward,
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Figure 7: Winners and Losers: Distribution of Output Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation
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Notes: Results of equalizing QMPK (left panel) and VMPK (right panel) across countries, 1975-2005. The white
line represents the median, and gradually from dark to light blue shades (i.e., as we move away from the median)
we show the interquartile (25-75 percentile) range, the 10-90 percentile range, and the 5-95 percentile range.
the stagnation of Japan’s economy, and perhaps the aging of its population, made the country
exhibit a behavior similar of the other developed countries.
A complementary look at the distributional implications of the barriers and distortions to
physical capital allocations is shown in Figure 9, in which the set of countries is divided into
per capita income quartiles (1st quartile composed by the poorest countries; 4th quartile by
the richest ones). As before, the vertical axes indicate the counterfactual gains (in percent) for
each group of countries and the horizontal axis the year; the left panel shows the results for
QMPK and the right one for VMPK. Four patterns are very clear from these figures. First, as
hypothesized by Lucas (1990), some capital would flow out of the rich countries to be allocated
to the rest. Second, this pattern of reallocation does not depend on whether we use prices or
not. Third, the amount of capital that would be reallocated from developed countries declines
over time in both counterfactuals, consistent with movement toward efficiency. Finally, and most
interestingly, the gains are not monotonic in income. For most periods, the countries that would
gain the most are in the middle, the second, and third income quartiles, and not the poorest
countries.
6 Examining the Reallocation of Capital, 1970-2005
A main finding in Section 5 is the improvement in the efficiency of the allocation of world
physical capital over the sample period. Such a result might seem to contradict those in the
literature, particularly the work of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) on international capital flows.
In the words of those authors “Capital flows from rich to poor countries are not only low (as
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Figure 8: Regional Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation
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Note: Results of equalizing QMPK (left panel) and VMPK (right panel) across countries from 1975 to 2005. See
Appendix A for a list of countries in each region.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAOSTAT.
Figure 9: Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation across Income Quartiles
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Note: Results of equalizing QMPK (left panel) and VMPK (right panel) across countries from 1975 to 2005.
Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAO.
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argued by Lucas, 1990), but their allocation across developing countries is negatively correlated or
uncorrelated with the predictions of the standard textbook model.” They call this the “allocation
puzzle.”In this section, we synthesize these two seemingly contrary views.
The efficient allocation of capital, in our basic framework as well as in many others, does not
distinguish between internal (domestic) or external (foreign) sources of capital. Looking at the
changes in the total stock of capital in each country is the most direct—if not the only—test of
whether, over time, allocations are moving in an inefficient direction. To this end, we perform
two exercises. First, we report regressions in the spirit of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), but
for changes in capital stocks instead of capital flows. Second, we report the results of simple
counterfactuals holding the shares of capital as of the beginning and end of the sample period.
6.1 Does Capital Accumulation follow MPKs?
Table 6 shows the results of regressing the growth rate of the capital stock of countries on the
initial value of the marginal product of capital and its growth rate. The dependent variable is
the cumulative growth rate (log differences) of the capital of each country in 2005 relative to
the stocks in 1970. We also report the results using VMPK or QMPK as the measure for
MPK.We report the results for the whole sample of countries and for a sample without the
OECD countries, to be consistent with the focus of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) on developing
countries.
The results in Table 6 strongly indicate that from 1970 to 2005, capital accumulation has been
positively—and rather strongly—aligned with the direction of the marginal product of capital.
First, capital is accumulated at a faster pace in countries with an initially higher marginal return
to capital. Regardless of whether we use either values of VMPK or QMPK in 1970 as the
relevant measure for the initial marginal product of capital or the ratio of Y/K in 1970 as a
proxy of initial capital scarcity, we find that capital flows accumulate faster when the MPK is
higher. The effects are quantitatively substantial and statistically significant.
Second, and even more importantly, capital accumulates at a faster pace in countries in
which the marginal product of capital, ceteris paribus, would have grown at a faster pace. To
see this, note that the growth in TFP (∆ lnZ),29 the growth in the share of physical capital
(∆ lnφK), and the ratio of the output to capital prices (∆ lnPY /PK) all have positive, and
statistically and quantitatively significant coefficients. A notable exception is with respect to
∆ lnH , the accumulation of human capital, which sometimes exhibits the wrong sign and is
statistically insignificant. A positive and marginally significant coefficient is attained only in
our least preferred specification, which includes only (∆ lnZ), ignore all other components that
drive MPK, using only Y/K in 1970 as a proxy for initial capital scarcity, and excluding all the
OECD countries.
Third, it is worth highlighting a number of other ancillary results. The first one is that the
overall fit of the regression is rather high. In fact, in our preferred specifications, columns (1) and
29Recall the definition Zj,t ≡ Aj,tT
φRj,t . Here, using our values of θj,t and φ
K
j,t = 1 − θj,t − φ
R
j,t, we impute the
value of these TFP -like terms as Zj,t ≡ Aj,tT
φRj,t = Yj,t/
[
K
φKj,t
j,t H
θj,t
j,t
]
.
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Table 6: Population-Weighted OLS Regression, ∆ lnK (1970-2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnZ 0.425*** 0.750*** 0.358*** 0.504*** 0.817*** 0.428***
(0.095) (0.164) (0.094) (0.092) (0.157) (0.104)
∆ lnH -0.024 -0.034 0.074 0.185 0.300 0.371*
(0.144) (0.224) (0.181) (0.126) (0.253) (0.203)
∆ lnφK 1.270*** 1.631*** - 1.348*** 1.597*** -
(0.269) (0.458) - (0.266) (0.442) -
∆ ln PY
PK
1.687*** - - 1.665*** - -
(0.124) - - (0.110) - -
VMPK1970 2.188*** - - 2.055** - -
(0.804) - - (0.786) - -
QMPK1970 - 6.729*** - - 6.340*** -
- (1.081) - - (1.124) -(
Y
K
)
1970
- - 2.610*** - - 2.400***
- - (0.438) - - (0.457)
Includes OECD Y Y Y N N N
Observations 76 76 76 53 53 53
R2 0.876 0.725 0.737 0.890 0.739 0.736
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. One asterisk means p < 0.1; two asterisks mean
p < 0.05; and three asterisks mean p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAO.
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(4), in which we regress growth of physical capital with initial VMPK and the growth of the
factors driving VMPK growth, the regressors account for almost 90% of the variation in ∆ lnK.
Needless to say, the high goodness of fit of the regressions does not contradict our findings that
important inefficiencies remain at the end of the sample period. The high goodness of fit simply
indicates the correlation in the direction of capital accumulation with the drivers of the MPK
and does not imply anything about whether the efficient magnitudes coincide with the observed
ones.
Another relevant observation is that the main regression results are invariant to the inclusion
of OECD countries. Indeed, the fit is marginally better when the OECD countries are excluded.
From here, there does not seem to be an allocation puzzle for capital in emerging and developing
countries vis-a-vis developed countries.
Finally, our preferred specification is based on the value marginal product of capital, VMPK,
as the driver of capital accumulation. Our simple model indicates that changes in both capital
intensities, ∆ lnφK , and the relative price of output to capital, (∆ lnPY /PK), should be included
as explanatory variables, if anything to avoid a missing variable bias. Such indication is vin-
dicated by the regression results. Both regressors are not only statistically significant at any
confidence level, but also greatly improve the predictive power of the regression.
6.2 Evaluating Counterfactual Allocations
We now use our model to conduct simple reallocation counterfactuals that provide different—
and complementary—examination of whether the allocation of capital has improved or worsened
during our sample period 1970 to 2005. In these counterfactual exercises, we compute the amount
of capital that each country would have if the shares of all countries, relative to the world’s total,
remain fixed at the levels observed in a given year. Then, we compare the implied efficiency
losses with that counterfactual with those based on the actual series, as reported in the previous
section. The difference between the gains starting from the actual allocation and those starting
from this counterfactual allocation serves as a metric, measured in terms of global output, to
evaluate the importance of the changes in capital stocks over time.
In the first counterfactual exercise, we assume that the relative allocation of capital across
countries remains fixed at the values observed in 1970, µKj,1970 ≡ K
O
j,1970/KW,1970, where KW,1970 =∑
jK
O
j,1970 is the world’s total physical capital as of 1970. Then, we construct a counterfactual
sequence of capital stock for each country j as
K˜1970j,t = µ
K
j,1970KW,t.
With the series
{
K˜1970j,t
}
, we compute the counterfactual levels of output {Y˜ 1970j,t } for each coun-
try and the implied world’s total Y˜ 1970W,t , assuming that everything in the world economy—that
is, the technologies {Zj,t, φ
K
j,t, θj,t} and labor inputs Hj,t for all countries—evolve according to
the observed levels. Then, by comparing the attainable gains from the actual allocations,
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Figure 10: Comparing Gains of Counterfactual Allocations
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ln
[
Y K
∗
W,t /YW,t
]
with those from the counterfactual allocation ln
[
Y K
∗
W,t/Y˜
1970
W,t
]
, we can discern
whether changes in the relative allocation of capital since 1970 have moved the world allocation
of capital closer or farther from efficiency. Exactly the same calculations are done for the value
benchmarks as defined in Section 3, where the shares are defined as µKj,t ≡
(
PKj,t/P
Y
j,t
)
Kj,t/K
N
W,t
and KNW,1970 = Σj
(
PKj,t/P
Y
j,t
)
Kj,t.
The second set of counterfactual exercises is done from the vantage view of 2005. That is, we
compute the shares µKj,2005 ≡ Kj,2005/KW,2005, compute the shares
K˜2005j,t = µ
K
j,2005KW,t,
and follow the same steps to compute the world outputs Y˜ 2005W,t and the counterfactual global
efficiency loss ln
[
Y K
∗
W,t /Y˜
2005
W,t
]
. These second set of countefactuals complements the first ones by
indicating how efficient the current distribution of capital would have been for the first years in
our sample.
Figure 10 displays the results for the counterfactuals based on physical and value marginal
products of capital, QMPKs and VMPK. In each panel, the solid lines represent the global
efficiency losses from actual allocations, the dashed and dotted lines represent, respectively, the
global counterfactual efficiency loses from an allocation that keeps constant the shares as of 1970
and 2005.
In terms of QMPK, the left panel of Figure 10 unambiguously shows that the global efficiency
losses would have remained approximately flat over time, around 5.5% of global output. The
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changes over time in the allocation of capital across countries has more than halved the efficiency
losses by the end of the sample. Interestingly enough, if the allocation of capital over the sample
period had been that of 2005, the global efficiency losses would have been the same, except for
the early 1970s and a handful of years in the early 1980s and early 1990s.
As shown in the right panel of Figure 10, the counterfactuals based on the value marginal
products of capital, VMPK, convey an only slightly different message. As with QMPK, this
counterfactual shows that keeping the relative capital allocations constant as in 1970 would have
led to a much more inefficient world, with three times the global output losses by the end of the
sample. The difference is that the counterfactual using the relative allocation of 2005 would have
led to a much more inefficient for any of the years prior to 2000. Overall, both counterfactual
exercises coincide in their verdict that the reallocation caused by capital accumulation between
1970 and 2005 was conducive to higher efficiency.
7 The Allocation of Human Capital
We now switch the attention to human capital and the cross-country distribution of its marginal
product. Our treatment of human capital is different than, and to some extend subordinate to,
that of the physical capital for a number of reasons. First, to be sure, reallocating humans is
more complex than reallocating machines. Machines do not have attachments, do not require
compensating differences and are not resisted by the pre-existent machines installed in countries.
Yet, human capital is reallocated across countries. Not only universities, hospitals, research insti-
tutions, but also stores, restaurants, and farms in the US and many other countries agglomerate
workers from all over the world. Second, contrary to physical capital (for which we have PKj,t/P
Y
j,t,
the goods cost for physical capital), we do not have a direct measurement of the relative cost of
human capital in each country and period. To overcome this limitation, we conduct experiments
that take two extreme and opposite views about the observed cost of labor across countries.
7.1 The Marginal Product of Human Capital
First, we report salient differences in the behavior of the cross-country dispersion in human capital
and its marginal product (MPH) relative to what we see for physical capital. The dispersion
of MPH is large and growing over time, and the accumulation of human capital does not track
the behavior of the determinants of MPH . Second, to the extent that differences in MPH
are driven by barriers to the mobility of labor across countries, the global gains of reallocating
human capital would be an order of magnitude higher than those of reallocating physical capital.
Third, the ability to reallocate workers would not only enhance the gains in global output from
reallocating physical capital, but, more interestingly, also induce a reversal in the direction of
reallocation of capital across countries. Instead of flowing from richer to poorer countries, capital
from poorer countries would follow some of their workers in the direction of richer countries. This
simple result could be useful in understanding the difference between integration agreements with
labor mobility (e.g., the EU) and without it (e.g., NAFTA.)
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Table 7: Decomposition of the Variance of lnQMPHj,t (1970-2000)
Variances (logs of each variable) Covariances (logs of each variable)
Year QMPHj,t θj,t
Yj,t
Hj,t
θj,t,
Yj,t
Hj,t
QMPHj,t,QMPKj,t QMPHj,t,
PYj,t
PK
j,t
QMPHj,t,
Yj,t
Hj,t
QMPHj,t,
Yj,t
Kj,t
1970 0.756 0.064 0.788 -0.048 -0.082 -0.019 0.740 -0.042
1980 0.713 0.061 0.726 -0.037 -0.169 0.058 0.689 -0.105
1990 0.748 0.058 0.642 0.024 -0.149 0.111 0.666 -0.107
2000 0.978 0.059 0.899 0.010 -0.038 0.029 0.909 -0.021
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0.
In our framework, the marginal product of one unit of human capital in terms of quantity of
goods (QMPHj,t) is simply given by
QMPHj,t = θj,t
Yj,t
Hj,t
.
Therefore, as we did with MPK, we can simply decompose the cross-sectional variance of
lnRMHi,j in terms of the labor share of output and the output-to-human capital ratios:
var [lnQMPHi,j] = var [ln θj,t] + var [ln (Yj,t/Hj,t)] + 2cov [ln θj,t, ln (Yj,t/Hj,t)] .
Table 7 reports the values of these variances and the covariance for a number of years over
the sample period. The right side of the panel also reports a number of covariances of interest
with respect to the joint reallocation of human and physical capital across countries.
Contrary to physical capital, there is an upward trend in the dispersion in the lnQMPH .
From a low value of 0.713 in 1980, the variance in lnQMPH grows thereafter until reaching
its highest value of 0.978 in 2000. Almost all of the variation is driven by the dispersion in
ln [Yj,t/Hj,t]. Indeed, the cross-country correlation lnQMPH and ln [Yj,t/Hj,t] is always above
0.95. Differences in the labor share of output, ln θj,t, account for at most 9% of this variations, a
contribution that remains flat around 7%-8% during the sample period. The covariance between
ln θj,t and ln [Yj,t/Hj,t] provides a negligible contribution.
The cross-country covariation between the marginal products of human and physical capital
is key for the potential gains of jointly reallocating these factors. We find that while negative, the
magnitude of this covariation is rather weak. From the variances and covariances of lnQMPH
and lnQMPK (reported in Tables 2 and 7), we see that lnQMPH and lnQMPK are always
negatively correlated. The magnitude of this correlation increases and then decreases at the end
of the sample. A very similar pattern is followed by the correlation between lnQMPHj,t and
ln [Yj,t/Kj,t]. Conversely, the correlations of lnQMPHj,t with ln
(
P Yj,t/P
K
j,t
)
and with lnVMPKj,t
exhibit quite the opposite pattern. Their correlations are negligible at the beginning and the end
of the sample but reach levels about 0.4 in the middle of the sample period.
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7.2 Gains of Human (and Physical) Capital Reallocation
We now use the same framework to analyze the efficiency losses from misallocating both, capital
and labor. In our setting, the fixed factors in each country are the TFP and the natural resources,
group in the term Zj,t ≡ Aj,tT
(1−γj,t)(1−θj,t)
j,t . Note that the output share of natural resources is
important for our computations because it determines the returns to scale of mobile factors,
human and physical capital, in each of the countries.
Baseline. The optimal global allocation is defined by the same objective as before—that is,
Y K
∗,H∗
W,t = max
{Kj,t, Hj,t}
J∑
j=1
Zj,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t) (Hj,t)
θj,t ,
but instead of setting human capital at observed levels, Hj,t = H
O
j,t, the constraint becomes
J∑
j=1
Hj,t ≤ HW,t
where HW,t ≡
∑J
j=1H
O
j,t for all t. In addition to equalizing the QMPKj,t of all countries to a
common world price, rKt , efficiency requires that all QMPHj,t be equalized to a common price
rHt = θj,tZj,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t) (Hj,t)
θj,t−1. (10)
Thus, the world supply levels KW,t and HW,t, and the productivities and endowments of
natural resources Zj,t of all countries pin down the equilibrium r
K
t and r
H
t . These prices and the
factor shares determine the factor intensity of each country,
Kj,t
Hj,t
=
γj,t (1− θj,t)
θj,t
rHt
rKt
.
The efficient allocation implies that human and physical capital are allocated across countries
to complement their TFP and natural resources as allowed by their country-specific returns to
scale to mobile factors. As before, there is not a closed-form solution except for the case of
common (time-varying) factors shares, but the numerical optimization is trivial.
Value benchmark. The previous benchmark presumes that workers are indifferent as to where
to work, and cross-country differences in output per worker are sustained by barriers to worker
migration. The completely opposite view is that barriers are not the key limitation, and wage
differences are sustained by compensating differences; Differences in QMPK, and thus in wages,
are sustained because workers demand different wages to live in different places.
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Attempting to model and empirically discipline the behavior of compensating differences lies
outside the limits of this paper.30 Instead, we focus on a simple exercise that reallocates workers
and capital but subject to keeping constant the real wages of workers, in terms of consumption
goods, whj,tP
C
j,t/P
Y
j,t, as inferred in the data in each country in each period. Since we do not
have direct measurements on wages in terms of output, whj,t, we use our model and infer it as
wj,t = θj,tYj,t/Hj,t = QMPHj,t. Thus, by fixing real wages of all countries at a point in time, this
counterfactual is consistent with any decomposition of those wages arising from compensating
differentials or barriers to mobility of workers. Notice also that if only workers, but no physical
capital, are allowed to move, the reallocation would be minimal, due only to the small variation
in the data for the relative price PCj,t/P
Y
j,t. For the maximization in this benchmark, the natural
resource constraint is that the global amount of goods paid for human capital services in each
period is equal to the one inferred in the data:
J∑
j=1
PCj,t
P Yj,t
whj,tHj,t ≤ H
N
W,t, (11)
where HNW,t ≡
∑J
j=1
PCj,tw
h
j,t
PYj,t
HOj,t and H
O
j,t is the observed data value for country j in period t. As
in the case when only capital can move, we impose the restriction
J∑
j=1
PKj,t
P Yj,t
Kj,t ≤ K
N
W,t, (12)
subject to providing the same amount of consumption goods to workers as implied by the data.
There is an intuitive interpretation for this exercise. Imagine a firm owner who is able to
reallocate resources across countries and his firm is small enough that takes prices as given. In
terms of wages, imagine this person is limited by country-specific regulations (unions, minimum
wages, and so on) to pay the period t wage in country i for any worker that he reallocates to
country i in period t. She is given the task of reallocating workers across countries to maxi-
mize real output subject to keeping the company’s payroll constant. Since we measure wages
by QMPK (disregarding PCj,t/P
Y
j,t differences), the firm’s owner has no incentives to reallocate
workers if capital cannot be reallocated. In this sense, this exercise provides a lower bound for
the global gains of human capital reallocation. Once capital can also be reallocated, there are
potential gains of reallocating workers even subject to the constraint of keeping wages constant
in each country.
The optimality conditions required the equalization across countries of the price-corrected
30For that, see Klein and Ventura (2009).
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marginal product of physical and human capital across countries; that is,
RKt =
P Yj,t
PKj,t
γj,t (1− θj,t)Aj,tT
(1−γj,t)(1−θj,t)
j,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t)−1 (Hj,t)
θj,t , (13)
for physical capital and
RHt =
P Yj,t
PCj,tw
h
j,t
θj,tAj,tT
(1−γj,t)(1−θj,t)
j,t (Kj,t)
γj,t(1−θj,t) (Hj,t)
θj,t−1. (14)
Note that, given the world’s returns Rt and R
H
t , the physical-to-human capital ratio in country
j should be
Kj,t
Hj,t
=
γj,t (1− θj,t)
θj,t
PCj,tw
h
j,t
PKj,t
RHt
RKt
.
Thus, in the efficient allocation, the physical capital intensity, relative to human capital, varies
across countries according to their (i) factor shares in production, (ii) relative price of consump-
tion and capital goods, and (iii) effective cost of labor. While natural resources Tj,t and pure
TFP Aj,t enhance the amount of human and physical capital a country should receive, the cost
in terms of output of both factors, respectively PKj,t/P
Y
j,t and P
C
j,tw
h
j,t/P
Y
j,t, reduces them. It is triv-
ially true that this maximization dominates the one where only capital can be reallocated. The
interesting question is how much and whether capital flows change in magnitude and direction.
Results. Figure 11 shows the global output gains of reallocating both physical and human
capital and human capital only, respectively. In each panel, the dashed lines represent the gains
from the benchmark. The solid lines represent the gains from the value benchmark as defined
above.
The most salient result is that the global gains of reallocating workers and physical capital can
be much higher—more than one order of magnitude higher—than the global gains of reallocating
only physical capital. The quantity benchmark indicates that, for all the years in the sample,
the global gains would be approximately 55% of world output. Those gains remain relatively
flat over the sample period. The value benchmark also indicates a larger gain, but only around
twice that of reallocating capital only.
A second important result is that the complementarity between human and physical capital
is a key determinant for the larger gains from their joint reallocation. As shown in the right
panel, reallocating human capital per se leads to very large gains in the quantity benchmark
counterfactual, but they are far from accounting for the difference between the joint reallocation
and the physical capital only reallocation. This finding is even clearer in the value benchmark,
where the gains of reallocating labor only would be negligible.
Yet, perhaps the most interesting result is a reversal of the direction of capital flows. When
only capital can be reallocated, capital would tend to flow from richer to poorer countries.
Instead, when both factors can be reallocated, capital would flow from poorer to richer countries.
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Figure 11: Global Output Gains of Production Factors Reallocation
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAOSTAT.
Figure 12 illustrates this for 1996 by comparing actual physical capital stocks (in logs) for that
year, with the resulting physical capital stocks after the two different reallocations. In the first
case, most countries in the data would increase their physical capital, receiving it from a smaller
group of the countries, including a handful of the rich ones. In the second case, most of the
countries would lose physical capital, sending it, along with part of their human capital, to the
United States and a handful of rich countries because of their high TFP and endowment of
natural resources.
We finish this section by examining the distributional implications of the counterfactual
efficient reallocations. In Figure 13, we show the change in the output of the country groups
by income quartiles. In the left panel, we show the results of equating both quantity marginal
products—QMPK and QMPH—across countries. The right panel shows the results for the
counterfactual with prices—that is, equating VMPK and VMPH across countries, where we
impose that the wages of workers across countries must remain constant at the level before the
reallocation.
A number of interesting patterns are evident. First the magnitude of the gains or losses is
much larger than when only one factor is reallocated, especially in the quantity counterfactual.
Second, in the quantity counterfactual, the richer countries (fourth income quartile) and some-
times the middle-to-high income countries (third quartile) would expand production, while the
poorer countries (first and second quartiles) always contract. Such a reallocation from poor to
rich necessarily involves physical capital. Clearly, the required reallocation is exactly the oppo-
site from Lucas (1990). This simple result could prove useful for understanding the resulting
capital flows from economic integrations, differentiating between those in which workers can be
reallocated (e.g., the European Community and the US-Puerto Rico), and those in which they
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Figure 12: Changes in the Allocation of Production Factors (1996)
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Figure 13: Gains of Reallocating Human and Physical Capital across Income Quartiles
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cannot (e.g., NAFTA and Central America Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA). This simple result
could also be useful in understanding the allocation of physical and human capital across regions
within large countries (e.g., USA, Brazil and China).
Another stark difference with the physical capital only reallocations is that in this case the
quantity and the value counterfactuals lead to very different patterns from each other. Once we
impose the distributional restriction that foreign workers must earn the same income as domestic
ones, the direction of global reallocation reverts, from rich to poor. Wage restrictions of the form
imposed here endogenously make the human capital of countries behave as fixed factors, and
reallocations tend to be similar as when physical capital is the only mobile factor. The wages of
developed countries are too high, resulting in factor flows to countries in the second and third
income quartiles, but not to the poorest ones because of their lower productivity and larger
curvature.
7.3 A Human Capital Reallocation Puzzle
To examine whether there is a reallocation puzzle for human capital, we now perform the same
analyses we did for physical capital. In this case, however, there is little evidence that the
countries with the largest increase in human capital were those with the highest return. In
general, the measure of the initial MPH appears insignificant in the regression to account for
the change in human capital (displayed in Table 8). Changes in TFP and physical capital are
also insignificant in accounting for changes in human capital. The R-squared values of these
regressions are also much lower than those for physical capital, indicating that these driving
forces are much less important in driving investment in human capital.
These results seem to be in line with Easterly (2002), who argues that “The growth response
to the dramatic educational expansion of the last four decades has been distinctly disappointing
... creating skills where there exists no technology to use them is not going to foster economic
growth.”
8 External Flows Versus Domestic Accumulation
For physical capital, Sections 5 and 6 documented a strong trend toward global efficiency. Section
7 showed that such a trend is not present for human capital. In this final section, we explore the
role of external flows in shaping up these findings.
8.1 Physical Capital
We first show that domestic savings drive the movement toward efficiency in the allocation of
physical capital from 1970 to 2005. In essence, the countries whose MPK grows the faster
were also the ones saving the most. Then, rather than contradicting, our findings reinforce and
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Table 8: Population-Weighted OLS Regression, ∆H (1970-2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnZ 0.081 0.098 0.044 -0.044 -0.021 -0.067
(0.085) (0.091) (0.093) (0.095) (0.089) (0.083)
∆ lnK 0.092 0.033 0.070 0.117* 0.065 0.109
(0.069) (0.070) (0.106) (0.067) (0.062) (0.081)
∆ lnφH -1.133** -0.935** - -0.706 -0.568 -
(0.429) (0.385) - (0.429) (0.383) -
∆ ln PY
PC
1.157** - - 1.083*** - -
(0.455) - - (0.373) - -
VMPH1970 ×10
−3 -0.015 - - -0.025 - -
(0.014) - - (0.015) - -
QMPH1970 ×10
−3 - -0.024* - - -0.030 -
- (0.014) - - (0.018) -(
Y
H
)
1970
× 10−3 - - -0.014 - - -0.011
- - (0.013) - - (0.013)
Includes OECD Y Y Y N N N
Observations 76 76 76 53 53 53
R2 0.411 0.340 0.176 0.471 0.349 0.174
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. One asterisk means p < 0.1; two asterisks mean
p < 0.05; and three asterisks mean p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAOSTAT.
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transcend the negative results of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) on the role of foreign capital
flows in attaining efficiency. We argue that, at least for the second part of our sample period,
foreign capital flows have been all but irrelevant for the cross-country capital allocation, echoing
the old result of Feldstein and Horioka (1980).
To this end, we perform an additional simple counterfactual exercise. We compute how the
changes in the allocation of capital across countries would change over time solely on the basis
of external capital flows. As in the previous exercises, we compute this for the initial year
and for the final year in a given period.31 For the former, the shares µKj,1982 = Kj,1982/KW,1982
describe the relative world capital allocation that year. Then, for each country, we construct the
counterfactual capital series for 1983 to 2000, as augmented or reduced by net capital inflows
{XKj,s}
2000
s=1982—outflows if negative—defined by
K¯j,t = µ
K
j,1982KW,t +
t∑
s=1982
(1− δ)s−1982XKj,s.
The counterfactuals from the vantage point of 2000, are derived from exactly the same formula
but using µKj,2000.
For XKj,s we use the negative of the trade balance of the countries.
32 We depreciate the
capital flows at δ = 4.64%, the depreciation rate for the US in PWT 8.0.
Figures 14 reports the results for the exercises based on QMPK and VMPK, respectively.
In each graph, the exercises with 1982 shares are in darker lines and lighter ones for 2000. Dashed
lines are used for the counterfactuals with the observed XKj,s. The finer, solid lines are the cases
when XKj,s = 0.
The most striking result is how little foreign flows change the allocation of capital and the
potential global output losses. External capital flows are dwarfed by domestic savings and
the overall capital formation of countries. The irrelevance of external capital flows for global
efficiency is succinctly shown by almost undistinguishable dashed and solid lines in both graphs.
If anything, the magnitude of the external flows is so small that, effectively, it does not really
matter whether they are misallocated or not.
8.2 Human Capital
To measure the role of human capital flows we also construct a counterfactual sequence of human
capital stock for each country H˜j,t, as we did for physical capital. More precisely, the stock of
31Data limitations, in particular the desire to include China, restricts us to the period 1982− 2000 and only 69
countries.
32The USD figures from the IMF are converted to PPP units using PKj,t and P
K
j,t from the PWT 8.0. To attain
global balance, we need an adjustment. We multiply all the positive net inflows by a ratio greater than 1 so that
the sum of XKj,s over all countries in the sample adds up to 0. Very similar results are attained using the current
account deficits to measure XKj,s, but the required adjustment for global balance is much larger in that case.
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Figure 14: Comparing Gains of Counterfactual Allocations: Role of Capital Flows
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human capital of country j in year t is
H˜j,t = sj,1970 ·HW,t,
where HW,t is the world stock of human capital and sj,1970 =
Hj,1970
HW,1970
. We also examined the flows
of human capital by analyzing net migration flows to each particular country {fHj,t}. In this case,
however, we do not have information about the human capital of the migrants. Therefore, we
assume that migration changes the number of persons living in a country but not the average
human capital index or the share of people employed.33
We find that the changes in human capital since 1970 made the global allocation of human
capital significantly worse (Figure 15). If in 2005 human capital was distributed according to the
shares per country of 1970, the gains of reallocation would be 30 percent instead of 43 percent.
The difference, 13 percent of global output, is a measure of much worse is the allocation of human
capital due to changes that have taken place since 1970. Adding migration flows does not change
the picture, so the changes in human capital that worsen the allocation of human capital are
internal.
33For example, that would be the case if the net flows from each country have the same characteristics as the
population of that country.
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Figure 15: Counterfactual Global Output Gains of Production Factors Reallocation
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9 Conclusions
We constructed estimates for the rents of natural resources for a large panel of countries for the
past 35 years. These estimates are useful for uncovering a number of patterns on the global allo-
cation of resources. First, while the substantial global misallocation of physical capital persists
over time, we found a clear indication that the global allocation of physical capital has improved
over time. Specifically, global output losses were around 6% in the 1970s, while these losses were
on the order of 2% in 2005. The latter number is still five times the previous estimates and easily
comparable with the estimates from other forms of international relationship such as the gains
of trade and FDI.
A second important finding is that disparities in the MPK are associated with observed
policies. Countries with more interventionist policies, which a priori inhibit and distort the
accumulation of capital, exhibit larger and more dispersed marginal products. Our results suggest
that the trends toward global efficiency are clearly aligned to the observed worldwide trend toward
market orientation. A third key result is that during the sample period the movement toward
global efficiency is accounted for by the strong association between the accumulation of capital
and the changes in the MPK. Initial MPK and changes in the factor shares, TFP-cum-natural
resources and relative prices explain almost 90% of the accumulation of capital. This movement
is driven by domestic capital accumulation, not external flows.
Finally, the most pressing issues concern human capital. The implied global efficiency losses
of the misallocation of human capital are one order of magnitude higher, around 60%, which
remains constant over the sample period. If anything, the misallocation of human capital seems
to have worsened. Some interesting patterns arise when we explore the joint reallocation of
physical and human capital. First, the gains are substantially higher. Second, the direction
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of reallocation can change and, instead of capital flowing from rich to poor countries, as first
explored by Lucas (1990), we find that capital—and workers—should flow from poor to rich
countries.
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A Data: Details and Extensions
In this appendix we explain additional aspects of our data. We also report on an alternative pricing of crops and
our results for an extended sample of countries for more recent years.
A.1 List of Countries
We compute the share of natural resources of output for a benchmark set of 79 countries for which data are
available for every year from 1970 to 2005. We organize these countries by regions: Africa: Burkina Faso, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Tanzania, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe. Asia: Bahrain, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Republic of Korea,
Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and Taiwan.
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the
United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, and Sweden. Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, and Uruguay. Oceania: Australia and New Zealand. Japan and the United
States, and Canada were left separated for their substantial role in the world economy.
We exclude Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Oman from our reallocation exercises because these countries do not
have data on human capital. This implies a total of 76 countries for our benchmark sample. In Section A.3
we expand our analysis to countries for which we can retrieve information on rents of natural resources, fac-
tor shares, physical capital, human capital, and output for the year 2005. The improvement on data collection
and sources over time and the presence of new countries since the early 1990s (e.g., from Eastern Europe),
implies more countries for which the required data are available. This new set of countries includes Armenia,
Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macao, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Romania,
Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Togo, and Ukraine. This
yields a total sample of 107 countries for the year 2005.
A.2 Valuation of Crops at Producer Prices
As discussed in Section 2, we extend previous estimates of natural resources rents from the World Bank (hence-
forth, WB) to an annual basis and for a larger sample period starting in 1970. The Wealth of Nations database
data were available only at a quinquennial frequency and only since 1990. Currently, The Wealth of Nation
(forthcoming 2015) is working on an expansion of previous database to an annual frequency and starting 1970.
The Wealth of Nations group at the WB has kindly shared their new (but still unpublished) data with us.
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Figure A-1: Benchmark at US Prices versus World Bank (Unpublished Data, 2015) at Producer
Prices
(A) Natural Resources Shares of Output
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(B) Global Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation
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Source: In panel (A), the definition of natural resources share of output that uses US prices to value agricultural
production refers to our benchmark, while the definition that uses producer prices to value agricultural production
corresponds to the most updated World Bank measurement (unpublished data, 2015). In panel (B), these two
measures of natural resources are used to compute global output gains from a physical capital reallocation exercise
where equalizing QMPK with MSS shares refers to our benchmark with US prices, while equalizing QMPK with
WB 2015 data refers to the producer prices analog.
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In expanding their data, the WB has also introduced a new relevant feature in the valuation of natural resource
rents in terms of crop pricing. While in previous versions the WB used export unit values to value agricultural
output, they are currently using producer prices to conduct these valuations. While export values might be poor
predictors of output value when the country’s markets are not well connected to the world market and/or the
quality of what is traded, their use to measure output was partly due to the lack of country-specific producer
prices for agricultural products. More recently, FAOSTAT has started to provide regular coverage of producer
prices/gross value of production, and the newest version of The Wealth of Nations (forthcoming 2015) values crop
production using the newly available producer prices, which tend to be lower than export values. This implies
that the WB estimates for cropland rents will tend to be lower than their previous estimates. This also affects
the rents from pastureland that are assumed to be a fraction of those from cropland rents (see Section 2) by the
WB. The rents from natural resources, other than crop and pastureland, remain unchanged in the new version
of The Wealth of Nations database.
Here, we compare our benchmark estimates of natural resources shares of output in which cropland rents are
computed using US prices as a proxy for international prices (see our Section 2) with the new estimated WB data
in which cropland rents use producer prices instead of export unit values. By large, both natural resources shares
are very similar, see panel (A) in Figure A-1, which scatters plots these shares for our benchmark (US prices)
against the new WB benchmark (producer prices). Not surprisingly, the implied global gains of physical capital
reallocation are also very similar across both pricing schemes. Our benchmark output gains are slightly above
those from the gains obtained using producer prices (see panel (B) in Figure A-1).
A.3 Results for the Extended Sample
In the main text, we focused on a sample of 76 countries for which we were able to consistently retrieve information
on rents of natural resources, factor shares, physical capital, human capital, and output from 1970 to 2005. With
improvement on data collection with time, as well as the emergence of new countries in the 1990s (for example,
after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe), data for more countries are available in the present than in the
past. In this section, we extend our benchmark sample to the set of 107 countries for which we can retrieve all
necessary information to perform our analysis for the year 2005. Thus, we explore the robustness of our main
results to the increased sample size.
We compare the global output gains from equalizing physical and human capital between our benchmark
sample and the extended sample in Table A-1. We find minor differences across samples or, if at all, our
benchmark sample tends to underestimate the global gains or reallocation compared with the extended sample.
First, if we equalize only the quantity MPKs, our benchmark sample implies global gains of 2.31% of output
in 2005, while these gains are 3.56% for the extended sample. In value terms the gains of equalizing MPKs is
2.02% for the benchmark sample and 3.78% for the extended sample in 2005. Second, equalizing MPH yields
similar insights. Third, the joint global reallocation of physical and human capital implies that, in quantity
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terms, our output gains in the benchmark sample are 56.0%, while in the extended sample these are 57.2%. That
is, extending our sample to more countries implies more global output gains. These underestimation are more
apparent in value terms where output gains are 5.78% in our benchmark sample and 7.74% in our extended
sample.
Table A-1: Comparing Gains (%) in Output in 2005
Quantity Value
Benchmark Extended Sample Benchmark Extended Sample
Equalizing MPK 2.31 3.56 2.02 3.78
Equalizing MPH 42.52 42.18 0.25 0.25
Equalizing MPK & MPH 55.96 57.32 5.78 7.74
Number of countries 76 107 76 107
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAO stat.
With the extended sample, we use maps in Figure A-2 to describe winners and losers of reallocation. The
reallocation of physical capital (top panel) is from large countries (red in the map) such as Australia, Brazil,
China, Russia, the United States, and Southern European countries, toward several African countries, India,
Eastern and Northern Europe, Canada, and Mexico, among others (blue in the map).
The pattern of reallocation of human capital (bottom panel of Figure A-2) is quite different. The countries
receiving migrants (blue in the map) are all developed: the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Australia.
The countries sending human capital abroad are China, India, Ukraine, Brazil, and other Eastern European and
African countries.
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Figure A-2: Winners and Losers of Reallocation
0 Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, WB, and FAO stat.
B Comparison with Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
In their seminal paper, Caselli and Feyrer (2007), henceforth, CF use the WB’s stocks of wealth estimates to
compute the output share of natural resources for the year 1995. In this appendix, we briefly review their method
and assumptions and compare their results with ours.
First, for the different natural resources items q ∈ {a, b, c, e, f} (detailed in Section 2), the WB computes
natural stocks, WSNRq,j,1995, for each country j, in their sample. They obtain their estimates by multiplying
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their data on the flow of rents rentsq,j,1995 by a present value term PV Fj,q:
WSNRq,j,1995 = rentsq,j,1995 × PV Fj,q,
where the present value factor PV Fj,q depends not only on the natural resources q but also on the country j,
PV Fj,q =
Tj,q∑
s=0
(Gj,q)
s
(1 + r∗)
s ,
where r∗ is the discount rate, Gj,q is the growth rate in the rent flows, and Tj,q. Unfortunately, the WB does not
have direct measures of r∗, Gj,q, and Tj,q is the terminal or exhaustion date of the resource. Thus, computing
the stocks requires making additional assumptions. WB assumes that the discount rate r∗ is the same across all
countries, 4%. More importantly, they assume that the growth rate in the rent flows, Gj,q, and the terminal or
exhaustion date of the resource Tj,q both vary by country j and resource q. In particular, they group countries
into developed and developing countries and assume that the rents for the developing countries grow significantly
faster (Gdeveloping, q > Gdeveloped, q) and exhaust later (Tdeveloping, q > Tdeveloped, q) than for developed
countries. Table B-1 shows the implied values for PV Fj,q for a range of values of Gj,q and Tj,q assumed by the
WB.
Table B-1: World Bank’s Present Value Factors, PV Fj,q
Developed Countries Developing Countries
Resources Gj,q − 1 Tj,q PVFj,q Gj,q − 1 Tj,q PVFj,q
(%) (%)
Subsoil Resource. 0 13 10.5 0 17 12.7
Timber 0 25 16.3 0 25 16.3
Croplands 0.97 25 17.9 1.94 25 19.9
Pasturelands 0.89 25 17.8 2.95 25 22.2
Table B-1 shows two important aspects in the resulting values for PV Fj,q. First, their numbers are fairly
large, meaning that given the rents, the present value factors can lead to very large wealth stock estimates.
Second, even given the same rents, the implied PV F are larger for poorer countries. This second assumption is
important because it implies that the natural resources shares estimated with this method (using stocks) will be
larger for poorer countries than for richer countries even if the natural recourses rents are the same proportion of
GDP.
In any event, summing over all the natural resources, the WB estimates a country’s total natural wealth stock
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in 1995 to be
Nj,1995 =
∑
q
NRRq,j,1995.
The WB estimation ends in this step. CF take those natural resources stocks and recover the rents using the
following method. They notice that on the basis of these stocks, it is possible to compute the fraction of non-labor
income that should accrue to natural resource owners. In particular, if rKj,1995 and r
N
j,1995 represent the rental
rate of physical and natural capital respectively, and Kj,1995 indicates the stock of physical capital in country j
in 1995, then one could compute the output share of natural resources as
φRj,1995 =
rNj,1995Nj,1995
rNj,1995Nj,1995 + r
K
j,1995Kj,1995
× [1− labor sharej,1995] .
However, the required cross-country data for rKj,1995 and r
N
j,1995 are simply not available. The key assumption in
CF’s method is that rNj,1995 = r
K
j,1995 for all countries j. Notice that this is not a non-arbitrage condition, since
N and K (as well as human capital, H), are two different production factors.
With this assumption, their estimate of the share of natural resources is simply
φRj,1995 =
Nj,1995
Nj,1995 +Kj,1995
× [1− labor sharej,1995] . (15)
We view our measure of φRj,t are superior to that derived by CF for a number of important reasons. First, it
is available for many years, not only for 1995. Second, it does not rely on the assumptions on growth rates and
exhaustion dates to construct wealth stock estimates. Third, it does not rely on the assumption made by CF
that the rental rates for natural resources and physical capital are the same. Our strong prior is that these two
assumptions strongly overestimate the importance of natural resources, specially for developing countries.
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Figure B-1: Comparing Alternative Methods
(A) Natural Resources Shares of Output (B) Marginal Product of Physical Capital
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The Natural Resources Shares of Output. Panel (A) in Figure B-1 compares our measure φRj,t
with that implied by the formula (15) from CF using data from PWT 8.0 for physical capital stocks and labor
shares. The differences are striking. Our measure indicates that for countries with per capita income levels below
$15,000, the output share of natural resources is on average 7%. The average using the measurement of CF is
much higher, above 30%. This stark difference reinforces our prior that the additional assumptions made in the
measurement using wealth stocks overestimate the relevance of natural resources. The overestimation of natural
resources comes at the cost of the underestimation of the output share of physical capital. As shown by Panel (A)
in Figure B-1, this bias seems stronger for the poorest countries. For instance, countries with per capita incomes
below $20,000, the difference between our implied output share of φKj,t and those using wealth stocks is around
15% of GDP.
The Marginal Product of Physical Capital. Not surprisingly, these differences translate into large
differences in the implied MPKj,t. As depicted in Panel (B) in Figure B-1, the differential of MPKs computed
with rents with respect to those proxied with stocks (i.e., as in CF) is positive and largest for the poorest countries.
Albeit smaller, accounting for natural resources has a substantial impact on the implied MPK relative to the
standard model (i.e. Lucas, 1990). Panel (B) in Figure B-1 also shows that our implied measures of MPK are
substantially lower than the standard measure using uniform physical capital shares, while the gap between richer
and poorer countries is less pronounced than in the standard model.
There are additional reasons for the difference between our MPKs and those obtained by CF. These are the
data sources for physical capital, output, and labor shares. While we use PWT 8.0, CF use data on physical
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capital and output from PWT 6.1 and on labor shares from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001). Figure B-2 shows
there are differences between those sources. The most obvious patterns are (i) the K/Y ratios are higher in PWT
8.0 than in PWT 6.1 and (ii) the labor shares are larger in PWT 8.0 than in Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001).
While each of these items has implications for the size of global misallocation, the main discrepancy between the
global gains attained in CF and those we find in our benchmark scenario are in its major part driven by the
differences in the measurement of natural resources shares of output, as we discuss next.
Figure B-2: Differences inK/Y and θ
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The Global Output Gains. We conduct two exercises to compare the magnitude of global misallocation
obtained in CF with that obtained in our benchmark environment and that we label as MSS. First, we show
a discrepancy between the results in CF and MSS in a direct manner by comparing the global output gains in
both environments. Figure B-3 shows the global output gains for both environments, CF and MSS, separately for
quantity and value units from 1970 to 1996.34,35 The CF environment simply replicates the global gains obtained
in Caselli and Feyrer (2007) based on their data and sample size, while the MSS environment shows the global
gains from our benchmark based on our data and sample size as described in Section 2.36
A clear message emerges: The global gains in MSS are roughly five times larger than those in CF. We
emphasize that these differences between MSS and CF are not only large but also statistically significant. In
terms of the evolution of global misallocation across time, the dynamics between the MSS and CF environments
also differ dramatically. While we find a clear movement toward efficiency from global gains of roughly 5 percent
in the 1970s to roughly 2 percent in the 2000s under the MSS environment, there is no evidence of a trend toward
34The sample is restricted to 1996—i.e., that is up to the year for which CF data (PWT 6.1) are available.
35As in Caselli and Feyrer (2007), we assume that the labor share constructed by Bernanke and Gurkaynak
(2001) circa 1996 remains constant across all years for the CF environment.
36Again, the global output gains are defined as the ratio between the efficient global output implied by the
quantity and value models posed in Section 3 and the actual global output.
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Figure B-3: Global Output Gains of Physical Capital Reallocation: CF versus MSS
Notes: The CF environment reproduces the global gains in Caselli and Feyrer (2007) from the equalization of
MPKs computed from natural resources stocks and their data sources for factor shares, capital, output, and prices
available for 51 countries (mainly PWT 6.1, WB, and Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001)). The MSS environment
refers to the global gains from our benchmark equalization of MPKs computed from natural resources rents,
factor shares, capital, output, and prices available for 76 countries, as described in Section 2. The global output
gains are defined as the ratio between the efficient global output implied by the quantity and value models posed
in Section 3 and the actual global output. In both environments, CF and MSS, we report the median global
gains and their associated 10th and 90th confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstrap simulations with 100 percent
replacement.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 6.1 and 8.0, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001), WB, and FAOSTAT.
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efficiency over time under the CF environment.
Table B-2: Comparing Alternative Data Sources and Samples: CF versus MSS (1996)
Data Source Gains Sample
Sample φRj,t (K,Y) θ [CI] Size
CF: CF CF CF 0.52% 47
[0.29,0.95]
CF CF MSS 1.01% 47
[0.48,2.05]
CF MSS MSS 0.98% 47
[0.51,1.87]
MSS MSS MSS 2.32% 47
[0.90,5.31]
MSS, Benchmark: MSS MSS MSS 2.51% 76
[1.45,4.17]
MSS, Extended: MSS MSS MSS 3.35% 107
[1.63,6.45]
Notes: CF refers to Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and MSS for this paper with data sources described in Section 2.
Recall that φR refers to the natural resources share of output data, (K,Y ) to the capital and output data, and
θ to labor share data. The global output gains refer to the median value of of 1,000 bootstrap simulations with
100 percent replacement. The confidence intervals refer to the 10th and 90th bootstrapped percentiles.
Second, to explore in detail the sources of our discrepancy with CF, Table B-2 presents the global output
gains of physical capital reallocation from alternative combinations of data sources (either from CF or MSS), and
associated country-sample sizes for the year 1996 ( i.e., the base year in Caselli and Feyrer (2007)). We start by
restricting the comparison for the 47 countries available in both the CF and MSS data sets, which we label as
the CF sample.37 The first row of Table B-2 reproduces CF’s results for these 47 countries and for which we find
median gains of 0.52 percent. In the second and third rows, we gradually impose the MSS labor share and capital
and output on the CF environment. We find that adding the MSS labor share increases the global gains to roughly
1 percent, and the MSS capital and output data barely change these gains. Note that up to this point, the global
gains are not significantly different from the CF benchmark (with an estimated overlapping range from 0.51 to
0.91 percent). In the fourth row, we add the MSS natural resources shares of output, φR, computed from natural
resources rents instead of natural resources stocks as in the original CF benchmark. We find that the global gains
37This restriction binds mostly for the availability of labor share data from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001).
Note that while the CF environment in Figure B-3 has 51 countries, in Table B-2 we use 47 countries. This is
due to the fact that in MSS (i.e., PWT8.0) we do not have labor share data in 1996 for the Democratic Republic
of Congo, El Salvador, and Zambia. Further, in MSS we do not have φR for Burundi, while CF does. However,
we find that the presence of these four countries makes no quantitative difference for the CF results.
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substantially rise to 2.32 percent—that is, the difference in φR between CF and MSS contributes the most to
amplify the gains of reallocating physical capital by roughly a factor of five in MSS compared with CF. Further,
as per the confidence intervals in these two environments, there is now a negligible overlapping amount of gains
for the range 0.90 to 0.95 percent. Finally, in the fifth and sixth rows, we respectively increase the sample size
to our MSS benchmark of 76 countries and to our extension of 107 countries described in Appendix A. We find
that increasing the sample size from 47 to 76 countries slightly increases the global gains to 2.51 percent and, at
the same time, increases the accuracy of our estimated gains, making the MSS results significantly different from
CF—that is, the confidence intervals between the MSS and CF benchmarks do not overlap. Finally, increasing the
sample size to 107 countries further increases the global gains to 3.51 percent and also increases the significance
in the differential global gains between MSS and CF.38
To sum up, the different construction of natural resources shares of output, φR, is the major component
driving the large differential in global gains between MSS and CF, and this differential between MSS and CF
gains becomes more accurate and significant as we increase the sample size.
C Misallocation versus Measurement Error
In this section, we explore the potential role of measurement errors in driving our results. We consider the
hypothesis that the world is fully efficient and that our measured misallocation is driven entirely by measurement
error. Since measurement error seems a more daunting possibility at the beginning of the sample, here we assume
that each country has the efficient allocation of capital in 1970, K∗, but we actually observe a noise measure
K = (1 + ǫ)K∗, where ǫ is a country-specific measurement error. We explore the results for two different forms
of ǫ : (a) an i.i.d normally distributed measurement error term ǫ ˜N(0, σ). Alternatively, (b) we consider the
case of a tax/subsidy rate that with probability 12 is positive (tax) and with probability
1
2 is a subsidy. This
second representation follows Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). We generate the stocks of capital for each country
as K = (1 + ǫ)K∗ and then compute the gains in terms of global output of reallocating capital.
Figure C-1 show the results. The dashed line represents the gains obtained in our benchmark reallocation
exercise, which are above 5%. The x-axis represents the size of the standard deviation of ǫ in the first exercise,
and the size of the ǫ (the tax) in the second case. The black line represents the median size of the gains for the
different values on the x-axis (the blue area represents the standard errors bands). When the black line crosses
the dashed line, that is the value on the x- axis that would generate gains as in our benchmark exercise. The
results show that to account for the gains obtained in 1970, measurement error would have to be very large,
between 50 and 60 percent of the capital stock.
38Note that our extension to 107 countries refers to the year 2005, not 1996. Nevertheless, under the MSS
benchmark, the global gains are very similar for these two years: 2.51 percent in 1996 and 2.29 percent in 2005.
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Figure C-1: Measurement Errors
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D Multilateral versus Unilateral Counterfactuals
In this section, we show that, for all but the largest countries, the counterfactual output gains of removing barriers
unilaterally would be very similar to that in our benchmark, multilateral counterfactuals. Interestingly, this is
different than trade and FDI liberalization exercises, more commonly found in the literature.
For a given year, by removing the barriers to the allocation of capital capital we obtain an efficient marginal
product of capital, MPK∗t . Given this efficient return to capital, we can construct country-specific wedges as:
∆j,t =
MPKoj,t
MPK∗t
,
where MPKoj,t is the observed MPK.
The graphs below show the gains in output from this counterfactual exercise in which we remove one wedge
at a time as compared to our benchmark results, in which all wedges removed at the same time. Strikingly, the
gains for most of countries are of similar magnitude in both exercises.
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Figure D-1: Unilateral versus Multilateral Gains
ARGAUST
BEL
BGR
BHR
BOL RA
BRB
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHNCIV
MRCOLCRICYP
DEUDNK
DOM
ECU
ESP
FINFRA
GBR
GRC
GTM
HKG
HND
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR
JP
KEN
K R
KWT
LKA
LUXMAR
MEX
MLT
MOZ
MYS
NER
NLD
NOR
NZL
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRTPRY
QAT
SAU
SEN
SGP
SWE
THA
TTO
T N
TUR
TWN
TZA
URY
USA
ZAF
ZWE
−
25
0
25
50
75
10
0
O
ut
pu
t G
ai
ns
 (%
) fr
om
 U
nil
ate
ral
 W
ed
ge
 R
em
ov
al
−25 0 25 50 75 100
Output Gains (%) from Multilateral Wedge Removal
Value
ARG
AUSAUT
BEL
BGR
BHR
BOLBRA
BRB
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
CO
CRI
CYP
D U
DNK
DOM
ECUESPFINFRA
GBRC
GTM
HKG
HNDHUNIDN
IND
IRLIRN
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR
JPK
KOR
KWTLKA
LUXM R
MEX
MLT
MOZ
MYSNER
NLNOR
NZL
PAN
PERPPOL
PRT
PRY
QAT
SAU
S N
SGP
WE
THATTO
TUR
TWN
TZA
URY
USA
ZAF
ZWE
−
50
−
25
0
25
50
75
10
0
O
ut
pu
t G
ai
ns
 (%
) fr
om
 U
nil
ate
ral
 W
ed
ge
 R
em
ov
al
−50 −25 0 25 50 75 100
Output Gains (%) from Multilateral Wedge Removal
Quantity
E External Flows and Counterfactual Allocations
Here we explain the construction of the counterfactual series of physical and human capital based on external net
flows of physical capital (current accounts) or human capital (migration).
Physical Capital. Data on net exports are from the International Monetary Fund International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS). We exclude 7 countries (Belgium, Greece, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Qatar, Taiwan, and
Zimbabwe) from our sample because of data limitations.
The sum of net exports across countries in our sample does not add up to zero; this is not surprising as we
include only a subset of global capital flows. We address this issue by adjusting net exports so they sum to zero
and countries maintain their status as senders or receivers of capital. For instance, we can adjust net exports
by a factor λt and define the adjusted flows as fˆ
K
j,t = λt1fj,t≥0 · fj,t + fj,t · 1fj,t<0. Results from equalizing the
quantity marginal product of physical capital using the adjusted flows are similar to those shown in Figure 9,
where λt =
|
N∑
j
1fj,t<0 f
K
j,t |
N∑
j
1fj,t≥0 f
K
j,t
.
Human Capital. Data on net migration are taken from the WB and are available at 5-year intervals starting
in 1972; we use linear interpolation to infer missing flows. To construct human capital flows fˆHj,t from population
flow data fHj,t, we make several assumptions.
We assume that a share dt of migrants f
H
j,t are employees. This share is equal to the average employment-
to-population ratio: dt =
N∑
j
Lj,t
Pj,t
N
. To convert these employment flows dtf
H
j,t to human capital-augmented labor
fˆHj,t, we assume that migrant human capital is equal to the human capital in the country hj,t into/out of which
labor is flowing, so that fˆHj,t = hj,t · (dtf
H
j,t). Assuming migrant human capital is equal to the global mean yields
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similar results.
As with physical capital, the sum of human capital flows does not add up to zero. Adjusting the flows to
ensure these flows add up to zero does not change our results.
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